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ABSTRACT 
 
RICHARDS OLAFS PLAVNIEKS: “WALL OF BLOOD”: THE BALTIC GERMAN 
CASE STUDY IN NATIONAL SOCIALIST WARTIME POPULATION POLICY 
1939-1945 
(Under the direction of Christopher Browning) 
 
This study begins with Hitler’s Reichstag Speech on 6 October 1939 in which he 
famously called the Baltic Germans ‘Heim ins Reich,’ focuses on their agonizing choice 
to resettle and on their wartime experiences, and ends with some reflections about the 
notion of Heimat for the Baltic Germans and their descendents today. It is based on 
research conducted in three archives: the National Archives and Records Administration 
in College Park, Maryland (NARA II), the Bundesarchiv-Berlin (BAB), and the 
Lastenausgleichsarchiv-Bayreuth (LAA). These archives hold, respectively, the records 
of the Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (RKFDV), the records 
of the Einwandererzentralstelle (EWZ), and postwar interviews with Baltic German 
participants in the resettlement. 
As the resettlement of the Baltic Germans was the only operation of its sort 
completed by National Socialist Germany, this case study can illuminate relations 
between Reich authority and the recipients of its ideological favor. The SS resettlement 
apparatus and its ideological aims remained constant in the face of changing wartime 
circumstances. What were the attitudes of the Baltic Germans, their goals, feelings, 
frustrations, worries, and aspirations, in the face of extraordinary circumstances?  
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The goal of this study is to render the Baltic Germans as human beings and to examine 
their experience within the context of mass population transfer, SS bureaucracy, 
ideological war, and multi-dimensional ethnic tensions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hitler’s Reichstag Speech of 6 October 1939 
Early one Friday afternoon – the date was 6 October 1939 - 60,000 Baltic 
Germans sat near their radios. In their houses and apartments, in their factories and 
offices, in their favorite local bars and restaurants, they waited: Hitler was to give a 
speech in the Reichstag. This speech was his first since Germany’s breathtaking five-
week Blitzkrieg against Poland, and the Soviet Union’s first, surprise stab at one of its 
neighbors to the west in almost two decades. War had not yet come home to their 
communities in Latvia and Estonia, but no Baltic German could say for certain that it 
would not. All that was clear was that a new violent chapter of European history was 
already being written all around them. What would Hitler say? 
The radios were tuned in. About an hour into his speech, Hitler changed the 
subject from the recent conquest of Poland and his justification of it, to his plans for a 
lasting peace in the East, between the Soviet Union and Germany.  
As the most important task, however: to establish a new order of ethnographic 
conditions, that is to say, resettlement of nationalities in such a manner that the 
process ultimately results in the obtaining of better dividing lines than is the case 
at present.1 
                                                 
1
 Text of speech found at: 
http://www.humanitas-international.org/showcase/chronography/speeches/1939-10-06.html accessed 20 
September 2007. Translation from the German provided by the website. All translations from German into 
English that appear in this paper are my own, unless otherwise stated. Whenever possible, English 
translations of German secondary sources have been used for ease. 
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He was calling for nothing less than the radical restructuring of Eastern Europe’s ethnic 
composition. A hush settled over the listeners. Some faces became pensive, turning 
intently to the radio.  
...for the east and south of Europe are to a large extent filled with splinters of the 
German nationality, whose existence they cannot maintain. In their very existence 
lies the reason and cause for continual international disturbances. In this age of 
the principle of nationalities and of racial ideals, it is utopian to believe that 
members of a highly developed people can be assimilated without trouble. It is 
therefore essential for a far-sighted ordering of the life of Europe that a 
resettlement should be undertaken here so as to remove at least part of the 
material for European conflict. Germany and the Union of Soviet Republics have 
come to an agreement to support each other in this matter.2 
 
The words must have hung in the air, thicker than the cigar and cigarette smoke. 
There could be no mistake, and it must have come as a shock: Hitler was talking about 
them, the Baltic Germans standing in that very living room, sitting in that very office, 
drinking at that very bar. For them, then, there was to be no escape from the whirlwind of 
events. 
In postwar interviews, Hitler’s 6 October 1939 Reichstag Speech in which he 
famously called the Baltic Germans ‘heim ins Reich’ – this single event, more than any 
other – was mentioned.3 It could even be likened – in terms of its momentous importance 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 
 
3
 The body of interviews being referred to is Lastenausgleichsarchiv – Bayreuth. Ost-Dokumentation 14: 
Berichte über das deutsche Volkstum im Baltikum (v.a. Umsiedlung). To my knowledge, it is the only such 
collection that is publicly accessible. The German Federal Archives describe the collection: “In the year 
1959, the [German] Federal Archives and the Baltic Historical Commission signed an agreement (Az.3785) 
according to which they undertook to document the resettlement, the political situation, and the community 
life of the Baltic Germans before 1945. This documentation – which consists of 50 testimonies and 
eyewitness reports – was complete in the year 1959 and was transferred to the Federal Archives, where 
they exist as Ost-Dok. 14.” “Im Jahre 1959 haben das Bundesarchiv und die Baltische Historische 
Kommission einen Vertrag (Az.3785) geschlossen, dem zufolge letztere die Durchführung einer 
Dokumentation der Umsiedlung, der politischen Situation und des Volkslebens der Baltendeutschen vor 
1945 zu übernehmen hatte. Diese Dokumentation – sie umfaβt gut 50 Erinnerungs- bzw. 
Augenzeugenberichte – ist im Jahre 1959 abgeschlossen und dem Bundesarchiv übergeben worden, wo sie 
im Rahmen der Ostdokumentation den Bestand Ost-Dok. 14 bildet.” 
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to the Baltic Germans listening – to the Kennedy assassination, the death of Princess 
Diana, or 9/11. Everyone could remember where they were when they heard the news. 
For them, this is when the Second World War began. 
After some brief contextualization, this paper will show that the dissolution of the 
Baltic German community, in fact, began with Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 6 October 
1939, and continued throughout the duration of the war as the Baltic Germans were 
dispersed across the Altreich, in the Warthegau, and along the war fronts in the 
Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS. In the final months of the war, order collapsed and it was 
every man for himself to escape the Soviets. Thus, the Baltic Germans began their World 
War Two story as a cohesive and unified ethnic minority in Latvia and Estonia, were split 
up into groups by the National Socialist regime according to its own political and racial 
criteria, further splintered in the face of German wartime requirements for soldiers and 
laborers, and ended the war as an utterly atomized group – or perhaps no real ‘group,’ as 
such, at all. The paper will conclude with an epilogue on the state of the Baltic Germans 
today. 
 
Brief International History of Population Transfer Leading to 1939 
The twentieth century has been called “the century of refugees” and the Second 
World War “the most appalling period in the history of migration.”4 The idea of mass 
population transfer and resettlement was not an innovation of National Socialist 
Germany. A major modern precedent for mass population transfer had been set by the 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne, under the provisions of which almost two million people were 
                                                 
4
 Klaus J. Bade. Migration in European History. Allison Brown, trans. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell 
Publishing, Ltd., 2003, pp. 165, 166. 
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exchanged between Greece and Turkey by reason of their ethnicity. This type of 
“‘unmixing’ motivated by ‘nationality-based policies,’” was generally considered an 
unfortunate but creditable last resort to settle international disputes.5 The interwar period 
in Europe was the age of Wilsonian nationalism. Between the end of the First World War 
and the outbreak of the Second, minority ‘questions’ were routine flashpoints of 
international conflict in Europe. If not banal, the notion of population transfers and 
exchanges at least enjoyed a place within the diplomatic lexicon.6 
After 1919, ethnic Germans were the most numerous minority in Central, Eastern, 
and Southeastern Europe.7 Millions of Germans “acquired minority status as a result of 
the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain and of the events that followed the conclusion 
of the peace.”8 And the minority issue, very much alive throughout the Weimar period, 
was a chronic source of international instability. In fact, because the subject could not be 
separated from the Versailles Treaty, it was grist for the mill of pan-German nationalists 
and, of course, Hitler. One often overlooked policy instituted by the Third Reich is that 
which endeavored to resettle ethnic Germans from all across Europe in the territories it 
annexed from Poland, with the aim of ‘Germanizing’ the area through demographic 
engineering. In the National Socialist mind, this “wall of blood” would then serve as the 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., p. 199. 
 
6
 “There was nothing taboo about the forcible resettlement of population groups and entire peoples in the 
first half of the twentieth century.” Götz Aly and Susanne Heim. Architects of Genocide: Auschwitz and the 
Logic of Destruction. A.G. Blunden, trans. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002, p. 285. 
 
7
 Joseph B. Schechtman. European Population Transfers, 1939-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1946, pp. 6, 24. 
 
8
 Schechtman, Population Transfers, p. 29. By 1925, their numbers were decreasing sharply. “The census 
of 1925 recorded about 1.35 millions Germans (2 per cent of the population), who in 1914 had lived 
outside the new German borders...Many of them were initially accommodated in refugee camps spread 
throughout Germany (‘homecoming camps’).” Bade, Migration, p. 199. Many peacefully migrated to 
within Germany’s new borders independently and still others returned after being prisoners of war. 
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main racial bulwark protecting the core German territories from the racial degeneracy of 
the East.  
 
Overview of National Socialist Population Policy in Eastern Europe 
From its inception, the extensive resettlement apparatus that eventually developed 
was a manifestation of National Socialist ideology. At its core was the fantasy of total 
ethnic consolidation. In fact, point number one of the ‘unalterable’ 25-point Program of 
the National Socialist German Workers’ Party was the following: “We demand that all 
Germans be united in a Greater Germany, according to the right of self-determination of 
nations.”9  
 After 1933, German foreign policy matched Hitler’s rhetoric, with National 
Socialist outreach and support being given to various ethnic German communities in 
Alsace and Lorraine, the Sudetenland, and elsewhere in Europe. National Socialist 
foreign policy operatives used ethnic German communities abroad as political tools to put 
pressure on foreign governments. Ethnic German sympathizers were recruited and guided 
by orders from Berlin concerning when to agitate and when to remain silent. Indeed, one 
of Hitler’s main pretexts for invading Poland – and thus starting the Second World War – 
was to rescue its ethnic German minority from alleged abuse. However, in the interests of 
larger foreign policy goals, Hitler was willing to ‘give up’ two such communities in 1939. 
In the first instance, Hitler instituted the ‘evacuation’ of ethnic Germans from the former 
Austrian territory of the South Tyrol as a concession to Mussolini. In the second, he 
‘called’ the Baltic Germans ‘heim ins Reich,’ in order to ‘save’ German blood and spare 
                                                 
9
 “Wir fordern den Zusammenschluβ aller Deutschen auf Grund des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes der Völker 
zu einem Groβ-Deutschland.”  
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the Baltic Germans from the impending Soviet occupation of Estonia and Latvia – under 
which they could, after all, potentially disrupt the strategic partnership between Germany 
and the USSR. These actions, at least, proceeded from reasons that are comprehensible, if 
reprehensible.10 
 But it was at this point that Himmler entered the story, and things became more 
complicated. Himmler was charged by Hitler with managing the emigration of the Baltic 
Germans and their resettlement in the former Polish territories that the Reich had annexed 
after its first successful Blitzkrieg. Himmler interpreted the order broadly and, on its 
basis, created “a whole new empire”: the grandiloquently-named Reichskommissariat für 
die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (Reich Commission for the Strengthening of 
Germandom), or RKFDV, with himself as its head.11 Through the RKFDV, Himmler 
created “a population program out of a refugee and police action,” one guided by the 
autarkic, utopian National Socialist vision of a feudalistic eastern Lebensraum cleansed 
of non-German racial taint and made fruitful by German peasant-soldier labor.12 
The entire resettlement effort thus became a thoroughly National Socialist one. 
The main organizations tasked with carrying out the screening and resettlement effort 
such as the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Ethnic German Liaison Office) or VoMi; the 
Deutsche Ansiedlungsgesellschaft (German Settlement Corporation) or DAG; the 
Einwandererzentralstelle (Central Immigrant Office), or EWZ; the Rasse- und 
                                                 
10
 Given the existing precedents, A.J.P. Taylor obliquely makes the argument that Hitler was being a 
rational European statesman in this first stage. To see his comments on the Sudeten and South Tyrol 
Germans, see A.J.P. Taylor. The Origins of the Second World War. New York: Touchstone, 1993, pp. 151-
58 and pp. 80, 194, respectively. 
 
11
 Robert Lewis Koehl. RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-1945: A History of the 
Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 
50.  
 
12
 Koehl, RKFDV, p. 52. 
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Siedlungshauptamt (Race and Settlement Main Office), or RuSHA; the Deutsche 
Volksliste (German Peoples’ List) or DVL; and the Zentralbodenamt (Central Land 
Office) were placed under the umbrella of the RKFDV.13 Thus, an SS office under 
Himmler’s direct control gave the orders. The organizations themselves were either 
overtly SS or heavily suffused with SS personnel. Non-SS organizations such as the 
Interior Ministry were increasingly cut out of the decision-making loop. It is axiomatic 
that Nazi bureaucracy was byzantine in its complexity: rife with internal squabbling and 
overlapping jurisdictions, uneven at best in its efficacy, and usually malevolently 
capricious. The RKFDV and the organizations under its direction – some pre-existing the 
RKFDV and others created later – were no exception, despite the unified chain-of-
command that existed on paper.  
The actions of the National Socialist resettlement machine – namely, the RKFDV 
and its subordinate organizations – can be usefully conceptualized as having taken place 
in three phases. They can be roughly characterized as (1) a booming start between 1939 
and 1942, (2) a period of stagnation in 1943, and (3) a retreat and rout in 1944 and 
1945.14 The rise and fall of the RKFDV and associated agencies thus mirrored those of 
the Third Reich as a whole.  
The first stage was a period of bureaucratic expansion, corresponding to the 
growing responsibilities the RKFDV was assuming – and the ever-greater ambitions 
behind them.15 Ultimately, in addition to taking on the task of resettling the ethnic 
                                                 
13
 Hereafter, the organizations will generally be referred to by their acronyms. 
 
14
 Robert L. Koehl describes the phases after its creation as “Efflorescence” and “Disintegration and 
Collapse.” Koehl, RKFDV. 
 
15
 For a recent look at this aspect of National Socialist bureaucracy, see Thomas Eric Spring. “The Nazi 
Resettlement Bureaucracy and the Baltic States of Estonia and Latvia.” Ph.D. dissertation, The University 
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Germans living in South Tyrol, Estonia and Latvia, and Soviet-occupied eastern Poland 
and Lithuania, the RKFDV successively added the ethnic German populations of 
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Crimea, Volhynia, Romania, dismembered 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Greece. Wheresoever German arms traveled, so went 
Himmler’s demographic engineering mechanism. 
However, upon arriving on the scene, the National Socialists found the situation 
far less black-and-white than their ideology had prepared them for. Not only did 
meticulous files have to be kept on each settler with regard to his or her personal 
information, financial assets, and so forth, but examinations had to conducted to 
determine the level of ‘German-ness’ of each person or family. The ambiguity 
surrounding the term ‘ethnic German’ gave rise to an intricate classification schema. 
‘Racial’ and political evaluations determined the destination of each settler: for the top 
category, an expropriated farm or apartment in the annexed territory; for doubtful cases, 
the Reich for ‘re-Germanization;’ and for the worst cases, either sent back home or 
possibly to a concentration camp.16 Families were usually kept together, although 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999. In ProQuest Digital Dissertations; available from http:www.proquest.com, 
publication number AAT 9956214; accessed September 9, 2006. It is perhaps emblematic of the confused 
nature of the National Socialist population enterprise undertaken under the auspices of Himmler’s 
Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums that there was widespread confusion even as to 
its proper abbreviation. For example, “Reichskommissar f.d. Festig. Dt. Volkttums [sic]” and 
“Reichskommissar f.d.F.dt.V.” occur on the same page in the same document. LAA. Ost-Dok. 8/456. “Die 
Ländische Siedlung im Wartheland: Die deutschen Massnahmen von 1939-1944. Hermann Deuz, ab 1943 
kom. Hauptstableiter der Landesbauernschaft Wartheland.” 28.12.1955. Also, sometimes odd variations on 
the theme are found, such as “Festigungskommissar für das Deutschtum im Osten.” LAA. Ost-Dok. 14/7. 
“Die Umsiedlung der Baltischen Volksgruppe zu Beginn des 2. Weltkrieges. Tonbandaussage. Dr. jur. 
Edgar Schwarz.” 12. Oktober 1958, p. 21. 
 
16
 In the course of the research for this project, I came across very few cases of this last category, because 
of the types of sources I was focusing on. One quite striking case, however, deserves mention. Bruno 
Wulffius was a Baltic German who lived in Riga. In 1919, the retreating Bolsheviks murdered his mother, 
father, and only sibling. He was only an infant at the time. Bruno Wolffius grew up with his maternal aunt 
and uncle in a Latvia. He was strongly pro-German and became a respected member of the Baltic German 
community. After 1933, he became vocally pro-National Socialist. In 1939, he was among the first to 
answer Hitler’s call to ‘return’ to the Reich and was resettled in Posen in due course. In 1941, Bruno 
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National Socialist officials had few qualms about seizing ‘racially valuable’ children of 
mixed or dubious parentage, turning them into wards of the state and putting them up for 
adoption by German parents. 
Although some of the costs of this vast operation were offset by the value of 
expropriated assets – which in any case were to be handed over in large part to the 
resettlers – there is no question that the economic damage due to population dislocation 
was immense for the Reich. The outlay for caring for the resettlers in transfer camps 
while they awaited suitable habitations alone was tremendous.  
After waiting anywhere between months and, literally, years, in barracks-like 
camps, transplanted communities of ethnic Germans were settled together in contiguous 
areas, either urban or rural, in order to maintain “familiar human surroundings.”17 
Separation from Poles, insofar as was possible given the demand for cheap Polish 
agricultural labor, was enforced. Sexual liaisons between ethnic Germans and Poles was 
punishable by death for both partners. 
One interesting irony of the resettlement process was that, try as it might, the 
apparatus was never able to settle even a fraction of the number of people it succeeded in 
expelling, giving the lie to the old National Socialist ‘Volk ohne Raum’ trope. To refill 
territories decimated by deportations to the General Government – the ‘Siberia’ or ‘ethnic 
                                                                                                                                                 
attempted to join the SS. During a routine background check, the SD noticed hints that his father might 
have been Jewish. As suspicions rose, the routine check became extensive research, including genealogical 
charts and character witnesses, provided to establish Bruno's Jewishness. Apparently, his foster parents had 
never told him that his father was a Jew. Bruno Wulffius was sent to a camp in 1942. The case lends 
support to the idea that Baltic German youth was especially receptive to the National Socialist message. It 
also suggests that Jewish lineage was something to be hidden in Baltic German society. See: NARA II. 
Captured German Documents T74. Roll 8. RDV 54. 380436-380519. 
 
17
 Schechtman, Population Transfers, p. 335. 
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dumping ground’ of wartime Germany – the Reich was ultimately forced to resort to 
coercive measures.18 
Insufficient numbers of ethnic German resettlers and the disappointing lack of 
forthcoming Reichsdeutsche volunteers to become trailblazers of Germandom in the East 
prompted the formation of the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL) on 4 March 1941.19 Over the 
course of its existence, it managed to ‘find’ approximately 500,000 ethnic Germans of 
various categories.20 In addition to helping tilt the demographic ratios in the annexed 
Polish territory in German favor, these measures conveniently increased the pool of 
candidates for service in the Waffen SS.21 
After the commencement of Operation Barbarossa – and even more sharply after 
the German defeat at Stalingrad – the activities of the RKFDV were hampered by myriad 
difficulties. There were transportation and supply shortages, air-raids that prompted the 
main office itself to move out of Berlin, and, eventually, manpower shortages even in 
central offices as men were called for duty at the front. The year 1943 brought virtually 
“The complete cessation of German transfer and resettlement activities.”22   
                                                 
18
 “Police arrived with a confiscation and deportation order in one pocket and a Volksliste application in the 
other." Koehl, RKFDV, p. 140. 
 
19
 Schechtman, Population Transfers, p. 345. 
 
20
 “The violation of this holiest of National Socialist principles was so flagrant that certain influential party 
leaders declared the strongest opposition to the policy of superficially Germanizing Polish elements and 
insistently warned of the dangers inherent in these attempts to make Germans out of Poles.” Schechtman, 
Population Transfers, p. 346. 
 
21
 “If sufficient numbers of ethnic Germans were not on hand, that program implied, Hitler’s underlings 
could simply create more.” Doris L Bergen. “The Nazi Concept of ‘Volksdeutsche’ and the Exacerbation of 
Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939-45.” Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 29, No. 4. (Oct., 
1994), p. 574. 
 
22
 Schechtman, Population Transfers, p. 351. 
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In the final stages of the war, the embattled system took on something of the 
character of a refugee relief organization. Resettlement operations existed as such in 
name only. The humans passing through – or finding themselves lodged uncomfortably 
somewhere within – the system at this stage were less settlers than refugees who required 
hasty evacuation in the face of the Red Army’s onslaught. The presence of ethnic 
German ‘splinters’ in Eastern Europe that Hitler had blamed for so much international 
tension in the 1930s abruptly vanished. 
 
Defending the Importance of the Baltic German Case Study 
As members of a discrete cultural group with almost 800 years of history behind 
them, the Baltic Germans virtually ceased to exist after the Second World War. What was 
the process that brought this rare event – the obliteration of an entire deeply rooted ethnic 
community – about? In 1939 and 1941, almost all of the 60,000 Baltic Germans living in 
Estonia and Latvia accepted the Reich’s invitation to “return home,” became Reich 
citizens, and settled on Polish land annexed to the Reich. They thereupon became pawns 
and, on Polish territory, co-perpetrators, in the National Socialist scheme to colonize 
German Lebensraum in the East. After the 1941 conquest of Estonia and Latvia by the 
German Army, Baltic German pleas to return to their old Heimat, now free from Soviet 
occupation, were ignored by the SS. In effect, the National Socialists went from the 
saviors to the jailors of their Baltic German charges overnight. The masses of Baltic 
Germans who fled the Soviet offensives of 1944 and 1945 were never able to coalesce 
into anything like their compact and united pre-war community, scattered as they were 
across Germany and the rest of the world as displaced persons. In the context of mass 
 12 
 
 
population transfer, ideological war, and multi-dimensional ethnic conflict, why did they 
leave their homes? How did they view and adjust to their radically changed 
circumstances after committing? And what was their own verdict on their decisions later? 
Given recent shifts in historiography, such questions as these are becoming more 
and more salient. German suffering is no longer a taboo subject of historical inquiry. For 
instance, Allied terror bombing, the widespread rape of German women by Red Army 
soldiers, and the mass expulsion of Germans from Poland and other Eastern European 
countries during the end and in the immediate aftermath of the war are all topics that have 
enjoyed respectable scholarly attention of late. The destruction of ethnic German 
communities, such as that of the Baltic Germans, by the SS warrants similar analysis, as a 
different kind of example of German suffering – one not only “provoked” by National 
Socialist Germany, but actually inflicted by it. While ostensibly designed to protect and 
“strengthen” ethnic German communities in Eastern Europe, the RKFDV and related 
organizations in actuality became a fearsome menace to them: uprooting and scattering 
them far and wide. The Baltic German community, for one, never recovered. 
A second reason that the case of the Baltic Germans merits inquiry is because it 
can help shed more light on National Socialist ideology: it provides an additional angle 
from which to understand the so-called “racial revolution” of the National Socialists. The 
Holocaust is, of course, the most horrific and most researched manifestation of the 
forcible demographic engineering that was central to the National Socialist project. 
However, there was another side to this engineering. Not only were allegedly unhealthy 
elements like Jews to be excised from Germany’s racial body, but Germany could also be 
given a transfusion of supposedly healthy ethnically German stock that was surviving in 
 13 
 
 
the East. Elimination and replacement were the two sides of the National Socialists’ 
ideologically motivated scheme. Thus, the Baltic German case represents another 
opportunity to fill a gap in the historiography. 
Admittedly, the Baltic Germans were only one group comprising about 60,000 
persons out of a total of roughly 500,000 people who, over the entire course of the 
Second World War, were designated ethnic Germans and thereafter caught in the 
National Socialist resettlement program.23 Still, “On the whole, the resettlement of the 
Baltic Germans can be considered the only fully realized German colonization 
experiment.”24 This example of National Socialist resettlement policy therefore offers a 
curiously under-utilized opportunity to better understand the Third Reich and its 
ideological aims. 
With regards to these last two points – German suffering and National Socialist 
population policy, as they pertain to the Baltic Germans – it must be cautioned that like 
so many others, the Baltic Germans do not fit neatly into the victim / perpetrator matrix. 
Undoubtedly, the Baltic Germans, collectively, are among the roster of victims of the 
Second World War. When it was over, many had suffered and died, and the community 
as a whole was irretrievably dislocated and verging on disappearance.  
But they were also the temporary beneficiaries of National Socialist crimes and 
thus co-opted into in the ranks of perpetrators. The farms and apartments given to the 
Baltic Germans in the Warthegau were forcibly taken by the relevant German authorities 
from their Polish and Jewish owners to be given over to the settlers. This turnover often 
occurred within a period of several hours, since cows still needed to be milked and 
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 Numbers, naturally, vary according to source. I have used the most frequently cited numbers. 
 
24
 Schechtman, Population Transfers, p. 319. 
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chickens fed. The lodgings came complete with silverware and place settings, linens, 
furniture, livestock and the like. Thus, the Baltic Germans acquired at no cost moveable 
and immovable property that was simply stolen wholesale. 
The source pool upon which this paper is based does not contain very much 
information on this subject, as important as it is. In the first place, the 
Einwandererzentralstelle was not responsible for this aspect of the resettlement and its 
records therefore do not include very much information about it. That responsibility 
belonged in large part to the Umwandererzentralstelle (UWZ), although a proliferation of 
different agencies cooperated or competed for the loot.25 They worked as a pair, the one 
hand giving, and the other taking away. As for the Baltic Germans themselves, it is not an 
accident, nor is it particularly surprising, that this aspect of the resettlement process is 
glaringly absent from their postwar recountings.26 
This aspect of the Baltic German experience will not be a major focus of this 
paper therefore. However, it is important to always remember that the fates of the Baltic 
Germans were inescapably intertwined in this way with that of the dispossessed Poles 
and Jews whose property they received. What the Baltic Germans had came directly at 
the expense of others and this should never be forgotten. 
 
Historiographical Orientation 
                                                 
25
 The bulk of the UWZ records are in Polish archives and were not part of the German records captured 
and filmed by the Allies after the war. They have subsequently been filmed for the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum but were not consulted for this project. 
 
26
 An example of this convenient memory lapse may be found in the 1985 collection of the stories of Baltic 
Germans who fled to Canada after the war which reads like a jeremiad: The Baltic-Germans: 
Reminiscences. M.F. Kuester, ed. Edmonton, Canada: Central and East European Studies Society of 
Alberta, 1985. The interviews held in the LAA collection similarly avoid the subject of the expropriation of 
Polish and Jewish property.  
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There flatly exists no in-depth historiography in English dedicated to the Baltic 
German case specifically, although a number of important works have been written about 
the resettlement of ethnic Germans generically, and thus of the Baltic Germans in 
passing. Of these, the major underlying questions investigated through the study of 
population transfer are those of how the National Socialist system as a whole functioned, 
as well as its relationship to the ideology of National Socialism and the Holocaust. 
The first thorough, scholarly attempt to analyze National Socialist population 
policy was the book by American Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population 
Transfers, 1939-1945. Research began in 1941 with the sponsorship of the Institute of 
Jewish Affairs and was completed in 1946. Schechtman’s was the definitive study for 
more than a decade and remains an extremely valuable source, even though not written 
by an academic historian, as such. Because of the nature of Schechtman’s commission 
and the timing of the book’s writing and publication, it is heavily oriented towards a 
public policy audience. The work was essentially written for what today might be classed 
as a policy think-tank. 
Even this earliest survey of National Socialist resettlement observed that “Faced 
by a difficult situation, made even more formidable by the density of the population, the 
Reich laid down two fundamental propositions: first, Polish and Jewish elements must be 
forcibly dislodged; and second, German colonists must be settled in mass on the soil.”27 
Thus, a dual policy was being pursued. In order to render feasible the immigration of tens 
or hundreds of thousands of people, as was envisaged, room had to be made, in keeping 
with rational economic thinking. “The simplest means of preparing occupational 
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 Joseph B  Schechtmann. European Population Transfers, 1939-1945. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1946, pp. 264-65. 
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opportunities for these persons was the expulsion of the corresponding Polish and Jewish 
elements from their positions.”28 Schechtman makes the connection plain. “A careful 
study of the timing of the deportations reveals that they were a kind of function of the 
transfer operations.”29 Yet, he does not elaborate. 
Institutional histories of the RKFDV, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, and, most 
recently, of RuSHA been have written, the better to understand National Socialism 
ideologically and in practice. The ways in which competing bureaucracies functioned and 
the role of the SS and Himmler in the endeavor are the larger underlying themes. 
Robert Lewis Koehl built his academic career as an historian of National Socialist 
Germany, and the SS in particular. His first major work, RKFDV: German Resettlement 
and Population Policy, 1939-1945: A History of the Reich Commission for the 
Strengthening of Germandom, published in 1957, lay behind his path-breaking new 
analytical model.30 The SS and its resettlement apparatus is certainly a case-study that 
lent itself to his new interpretation of the “neofeudal” functioning of the National 
Socialist state. Koehl’s aim for the book was “to relate the development of the whole 
program of imperialism via demography to the men and the government of Nazi 
Germany.”31 The outcome was the story of the “proliferation of Himmler’s power.”32 
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 Schechtman, Population Transfers, p. 326. 
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 Schechtman, Population Transfers, p. 267. 
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 Koehl, RKFDV. The work began as his Harvard University doctoral dissertation. See Ibid., p. ix. 
According to Lumans, Koehl has an “updated” version of this work: Robert Lewis Koehl. The Black 
Corps: The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1983. Lumans, Valdis. Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German 
National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993, p. 14.  
Also see: Robert Lewis Koehl. “A Prelude to Hitler’s Greater Germany,” in The American Historical 
Review. Vol. 59, No. 1 (Oct., 1953), pp. 43-65. Also see: Robert Lewis Koehl. “Feudal Aspects of National 
Socialism,” in The American Political Science Review. Vol. 54, No. 4 (Dec., 1960), pp. 921-933.  
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Himmler was the biggest ‘winner’ in a multi-dimensional, internecine power struggle 
within the National Socialist ruling elite that had ramifications for their respective 
retainers all the way down the line. The ethnic Germans caught in the machine were, to 
Koehl, simply “pawns” and thus another group to be counted among the victims of 
National Socialism.33 
Valdis Lumans, a Latvian-American whose childhood memories are of life in a 
displaced persons’ camp in the American occupation zone in Germany, has also made an 
important contribution to the historiography of National Socialist resettlement. He chose 
as his focus the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi), or Ethnic German Liaison Office, 
and traced its “evolution as a Third Reich institution” within the “chaotic mix of 
overlapping jurisdictions and competing authorities.”34 He also demonstrated that the 
entire resettlement effort was even more than a thoroughly National Socialist one – it was 
defined almost exclusively by the SS. Lumans reached a different conclusion than Koehl 
on “the question of whether the Volksdeutsche served the Reich as willing accomplices, 
as ‘Fifth Columns,’ or were instead Nazi victims themselves, caught up in tragic 
circumstances.”35 To Lumans, they were more than pawns: they were willing subjects 
and, in many cases, accomplices and collaborators. 
                                                                                                                                                 
31
 Koehl, RKFDV, p. 1. In Koehl’s narrative, “The ethnic Germans were merely poor pawns in [Himmler’s] 
gambit to win control over this colonial territory.” Koehl, RKFDV, p. 74.  
 
32
 Koehl, RKFDV, p. 31. “The German wartime resettlement and population policy, in the hands of 
Heinrich Himmler, had been founded on the spur of a few moments of victory” once Poland had been 
defeated and a partnership with the Soviets formed. Koehl, RKFDV, p. 161. 
 
33
 Koehl, RFKDV, p. 229. For a much less charitable contemporary account, see: Lundin, C. Leonard. “The 
Nazification of the Baltic German Minorities.” Journal of Central European Affairs. Vol. 7. (April 1947), 
pp. 1-28. 
 
34
 Lumans, Auxiliaries, pp. 142, 13. 
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 Lumans, Auxiliaries, p. 14. 
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Götz Aly started publishing his own views of the resettlement process in the early 
1990s, sparking the next generation of the historiography on National Socialist 
resettlement policy. Aly’s works – in sometime cooperation with Susanne Heim – 
represented a dual breakthrough: not only did he radically advance historical thinking 
about the whole resettlement apparatus, but he further, in so doing, advanced the 
historiography of the Holocaust by directly connecting the two.36 Aly proved the 
existence of a connection to the Holocaust that was direct and unavoidable and pointed 
him to certain radical and provocative conclusions. 
Aly, it should be noted, was not the first historian to establish a link between the 
transfer of ethnic Germans into the annexed Polish territories and the simultaneous 
deportation of Jews to the General Government. As we have seen, even Schechtman was 
aware of a connection. However, Christopher Browning was the first historian to usefully 
investigate, in detail, exactly how that connection specifically related to genocide.37 To 
Browning, the several over-arching demographic plans were in competition: the transfer 
of ethnic Germans to former Poland, the expulsion of Poles further east, and the 
expulsion of Jews still further east. While, on the one hand, “Nazi racial policy was 
radicalized in quantum jumps that coincided with the peaks of German military success,” 
their actual capacity to carry out their sweeping demographic plans could not match their 
                                                 
36
 Because this thesis has been propounded in a number of sources that I am viewing as a whole, but 
Susanne Heim is only credited for collaborating with Götz Aly on one of them, I will simply refer to Aly as 
the author in the body text for the sake of convenience. The footnotes will reveal if Susanne Heim should 
also be credited for a given point.  
 
37Christopher R. Browning. “Nazi Resettlement and the Search for a Solution to the Jewish Question, 1939-
1941,” in The German Studies Review. Vol. 9, No. 3 (Oct., 1986), pp. 497-519. This essay was reprinted in 
Christopher R. Browning. The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution. Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
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ambitions.38 Though Browning’s argument is far more nuanced and pays scrupulous 
attention to chronology, in essence it is that frustration at the difficulty of implementing 
mass population transfers significantly contributed to the decision for the ‘Final 
Solution.’ It proved logistically less feasible to effect the resettlement of so many Jews 
than to kill them outright. Deportation and resettlement or reservation plans preceded the 
notion of outright genocide of the Jews. The transfer of ethnic Germans, however, tied up 
the resources necessary for the expulsion of the Jews to the East. “The Jewish question 
was just as important, but not as urgent as volksdeutsch resettlement.”39 The murder of 
the Jews became, to National Socialist demographic planners, an expedient alternative.  
Aly and Heim, several years after Browning put forward this thesis, claimed a far 
more controversial connection between the transfer of ethnic Germans and the Holocaust. 
It is for this reason that their thesis represents an important shift in the historiography. 
To Aly, “it is clear that the Germans responsible for population policies sought to 
solve the problems that arose in implementing the Heim-ins-Reich program for the ethnic 
Germans at the expense of the Jews”40 from the start. Aly argues that indeed a causal 
relationship between the two existed. The resettlement operations putatively undertaken 
on behalf of ethnic Germans were the other side of a coin that cannot be usefully 
examined in isolation from the events leading to the Holocaust – i.e. the forcible 
‘evacuation’ of Jews from their homes and into ghettos and, eventually, camps. As Aly 
puts it: “historians have isolated individual questions from the overall context, thus 
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 Browning, Path to Genocide, p. 24. 
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 Götz Aly. ‘Final Solution’: Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European Jews. Belinda 
Cooper and Allison Brown, trans. London: Arnold, 1999, p. 9. Italics in original. 
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forfeiting the chance to analyze Himmler’s race and resettlement policies in their 
complex totality and on the basis of their inner logic.”41 One cause of the Holocaust, then, 
was the necessity of clearing space for ethnic Germans.42 Particularly important for the 
Baltic Germans especially was the availability of urban space – space where Jews were 
disproportionately concentrated. In view of the evidence Aly presents to demonstrate the 
fairly obvious link between the mechanism bringing ethnic Germans into the 
incorporated Polish territories and the – in many ways disquietingly parallel – mechanism 
forcing Polish Jews out, the wonder is how it was known, but largely ignored, for so long. 
Or, perhaps more accurately put: while widely acknowledged to have been the recipients 
of Jewish property on a large scale, Aly is the first to have cast them in the role of the 
wrecking ball. 
Aly termed this series of improvisations that eventually gave rise to the Holocaust 
an “ethnic domino policy” and shows, by focusing on mid-level SS planners, “direct 
organizational connection between the settlement of ‘ethnic Germans,’ the expulsion of 
Poles and the deportation and murder of the Jews.”43 It is not simply that the SS, as an 
organization, was in charge of both the resettlement of ethnic Germans and the 
implementation of the ‘Final Solution.’ A sizable proportion of upper- and mid-level SS 
personnel, as individuals, often found themselves executing both policies over the course 
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of their careers.44 Interestingly, Aly’s argument, in some sense, in encapsulated by his 
statement that:  “When, beginning in the autumn of 1941, German authorities spoke of 
‘deportation,’ ‘displacement,’ ‘resettlement,’ or ‘evacuation’ of Jews while now in fact 
meaning murder, this should not be seen merely as an effort to camouflage their actions; 
it also serves as an indication of the evolution of events leading up to the Holocaust.”45 
On this subject, it is important to note that one of Aly’s main breaks with the rest 
of existing scholarship is the way he de-emphasizes the role played by ideology in 
general, and anti-Semitism in particular, as a driving factor behind the Holocaust. Instead, 
Aly views the Holocaust as a “byproduct” of the carrying-out of the National Socialists’ 
“real” demographic objective of Germanizing the land. The extermination of the Jews 
was not a priority in its own right, but a consequence of other ethno-racial policies.
 A whole new angle of inquiry into the resettlement of ethnic Germans, National 
Socialist ideology, and the origins of the Holocaust, will be explored by Doris Bergen in 
her forthcoming monograph entitled Hitler’s Chosen People: The ‘Volksdeutschen’ of 
Eastern Europe in the Second World War.46 While her work is yet to be published in 
monograph form, it is well worth noting the central points of her new argument as set 
forth in her recent essay, “The Nazi Concept of ‘Volksdeutsche’ and the Exacerbation of 
Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939-45,” as an indication of new lines in the field. 
Bergen puts National Socialist ideology at the center of her analysis, using it to help 
explain the noted anti-Semitism and its violent manifestations that the Germans 
encountered in Eastern Europe. 
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The argument focuses on National Socialist language and notions of their racial 
mission in the East: 
In the closed system of National Socialist thought, the mere existence of the 
Volksdeutsche provided some legitimation for the murder of millions. The idea 
that ethnic Germans would inherit the homes and possessions of people whom 
nazi ideology defined as unworthy Jewish lives made the so-called struggle for 
living space more concrete. At the same time, the notion that pure Germans had 
somehow been trapped outside the Reich and forced to suffer under alien rule 
provided Hitler’s forces with a pretext to overrun eastern Europe. If the 
Volksdeutsche had not existed, the nazis might have invented them.47 
 
Further, Bergen argues that the nebulous and unstable definition of ‘ethnic 
German,’ in itself, enflamed ethnic tensions and, in particular, exacerbated anti-Jewish 
sentiment.  “In a fundamental way, the dichotomy in nazi racial policy between Jews and 
Volksdeutsche created incentives for open support of anti-Semitic activity.”48 Their 
homes, businesses, land, and other property were essentially on the auction block, ready 
for any takers able to prove their Germanness. In addition to expropriated property, status 
as an ethnic German conferred other benefits such as additional rations and other 
privileges. Preservation of oneself and one’s family, as well as crude greed, were 
motivating factors. The easiest way to demonstrate one’s Germanness was to act National 
Socialist.49 “[T]he tenuousness of  the concept of Volksdeutsche encouraged anti-
semitism as a way of establishing German credentials.”50 This, in turn, compromised 
such individuals and gave them a stake in the National Socialist project. This line of 
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reasoning may also help explain some of the willingness of various Eastern Europeans to 
help perpetrate the Holocaust. Doris Bergen’s forthcoming monograph promises to take 
the subject in new directions.51 
Interest in the subject of National Socialist population policy and ethnic Germans 
in Eastern Europe is growing, with at least one very recent dissertation on the subject and 
possibly more works to follow.52 
German-language historiography produced in the Federal Republic of Germany 
has been relatively kind to the Baltic Germans until recently. For example, a compilation 
of primary source documents purporting to demonstrate that that the Baltic Germans are 
blameless for their fate is dedicated “To all those who, as a consequence of the 
partitioning of Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of interest, lost their lives, 
their freedom, and their homeland.”53 It is clear from the context that the Baltic Germans 
belong to this category.  
German-language historiography also showed an initial reluctance to link the 
story of the Baltic Germans with some of the larger themes mentioned above, particularly 
the Holocaust. This first phase generally produced jeremiads, possibly written by Baltic 
Germans themselves.54 It seems that the historical profession at large took little interest in 
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them. Until the 1980s, most works adopt this usual framing: “Voluntary return home, or 
dictated option?”55 According to the logic, if the Baltic Germans left voluntarily, this 
means that they believed in National Socialism, and ergo, are undeserving of sympathy. 
But if the oxymoronic “dictated option” was in fact the reason that they left their homes – 
that is, that they had no realistic choice but to comply with the terms set by the National 
Socialists – then theirs is a tragic story. The latter case is usually made.56 
More recent German-language historiography on the Baltic Germans is 
significantly more sophisticated.57 Isabel Heinemann has also made an important 
contribution to the study of National Socialist population and resettlement policy, 
published a staggeringly in-depth institutional history of another RKFDV appurtenance in 
her 2003 ‘Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut’: Das Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS 
und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas.58 Though a tome, this work is highly 
interesting as it follows the lives and careers of one hundred ‘racial experts’ in the 
employ of the Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA), or Race and Settlement Main 
Office, and attempts to assess their impact on the overall resettlement project as they 
floated through the various relevant organs, offering their ‘expertise.’ Heinemann, unlike 
most of the historians who preceded her, seems to think that the RuSHA is more 
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important to understanding the unfolding of National Socialist population policy than the 
RKFDV or VoMi. 
Heinemann also is ready to agree with Aly about the indivisible nature of the 
resettlement and the Holocaust. “It is to Götz Aly’s credit to have linked the analysis of 
National Socialist nationality politics with Holocaust research in the first place.”59 She 
does not, however, go as far as he regarding the merely bureaucratic causes behind them, 
instead according great weight to National Socialist racial ideology – its “Kernelement” – 
as the primary driving factor.60 Driven by ideology, they actively participated in the 
attempt to impose plastic surgery on the ethnographic face of Europe. Heinemann argues 
that the RuSHA exerted more influence on the goals and outcome of the program than 
previous scholars have credited it for. 
Heinemann is in fundamental agreement with Aly and Heim that the need to make room 
for ethnic German settlers provided impetus to the deportation of Jews as well as the vast 
majority of Poles, who were judged racially un-Germanizable. However, the Holocaust is 
only at the center of her work by implication. Interestingly, as Heinemann traces the 
RuSHA and its personnel over time, she integrates National Socialist racial policies in the 
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occupied West with those in the East. This contribution alone is extremely valuable, as 
previous studies seem to have isolated West and East not only as simply different cases, 
but actually almost unconnected. Yet the same National Socialist organs and, often, even 
personnel had responsibility over both.
  
II. THE HISTORY OF THE BALTIC GERMANS, 1200-1939 
 This section will provide the necessary context in an abbreviated form, with the 
object of showing that, by and large, the Baltic Germans were a disaffected minority 
accustomed to past privilege in lands where they now faced increasing persecution. 
Although their conditions were objectively not by any means poor, and in comparison 
with ethnic Germans elsewhere downright princely, they still had some reason to look to 
National Socialist Germany for support. 
 
Drang Nach Osten 
National Socialist propaganda was often filled with images hearkening back to the 
medieval glory days of the Holy Roman Empire. It is one of the ironies of the effective 
dissolution of the Baltic Germans by the National Socialists that the Baltic Germans, as a 
group, had the closest historical ties to to this propaganda hobbyhorse.61 Their history in 
the Baltic began in the late 1100s, first as merchants, then as, literally, crusaders. 
National Socialist notions of conquering and civilizing the East often explicitly 
hearkened back to the original “Drang nach Osten.” A variety of indigenous tribes living 
along the Baltic Sea were subdued militarily, converted, and enserfed.
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Ruling Class Under Other Empires 
Until the 1920s, the descendants of these conquerors, known as ‘Baltic Germans,’ 
enjoyed the lion’s share of political and economic control in Latvia, whether the territory 
was officially a part of Poland-Lithuania as it was in the 1500s, the Kingdom of Sweden 
as it was in the 1600s, or under the Tsars, as it was from the Great Northern War until the 
1917 Russian Revolution. 
Courland and Livonia came under Tsarist rule beginning in the early 1700s – the 
spoils of the Great Northern War with Sweden. The Baltic Germans continued to 
dominate the political, economic, and religious life in Livonia and Courland, as they had 
since the 1200s. By the eve of the 20th Century, suppressing the Latvians’ burgeoning 
nationalism was becoming a full-time job for Tsarist officials and their Baltic German 
collaborators. It is no coincidence that at the same time, the first sizable classes of 
Latvian university students were graduating. Prior to this emergence of Latvian national 
consciousness, upwardly mobile elements of the indigenous population tended to 
assimilate into the ranks of the Baltic Germans, even going so far as to adopt German 
names.62 This was actually judged a “Volkstumswechsel,” or change of ethnicity or 
nationality. Another advantage of this strategy sprung from the danger of the 
development of hereditary diseases in small, endogamous communities – a phenomenon 
always common to aristocratic classes everywhere. Baltic Germans were forced to 
“Germanize” Latvians to sustain a healthy gene pool throughout the 19th century and 
probably before. Racialist ideas were apparently not part of Baltic German discourse at 
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that time. In fact, one important study of the Baltic Germans during the second half of the 
nineteenth century found that their “belief that linguistic nationality was a subsidiary 
function of social class” led them “to view Latvian nationalism as a false front for social 
radicalism.”63  
When a hail of Tsarist bullets felled the priest Gapon in St. Petersburg, the 
relatively industrialized Baltic territories were ripe for an insurgency. The 1905 
Revolution began in Riga’s factories as a movement directed at factory owners, many of 
whom were Baltic Germans, and turned into an agrarian revolt as news spread to the 
countryside and outlying towns. If the first phase was directed primarily against the partly 
Baltic German owners of the means of production in Riga and the Russian autocracy that 
protected them, then the second phase moved against the landed German aristocracy. The 
Baltic German presence was not as thick on the ground in small towns and rural areas as 
it was in urban industrial centers, but it was even more disproportionately influential. 
Here, the 1905 Revolution manifested itself in attacks by Latvian peasants on their 
German landlord’s latifundia.64 Though by now much of the farmland of Livonia and 
Courland was formally owned by Latvians after their emancipation in 1817, they were 
still beholden in many ways to their wealthier Baltic German neighbors, and the 
resentment ran deep.65 
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A Latvian peasant militia constituted itself at the local level and something akin to 
a civil war broke out across the countryside of Livonia and Courland between rampaging 
peasants and a Baltic German militia, the Selbstschutz. Committees were elected to 
replace authority in Latvian villages and rural communes that had overthrown their Baltic 
German landlords or former-landlords and chased out any Russian police or military 
presence. Hundreds of farms and manors were burned, hundreds of partisans died on both 
sides. Martial law was declared from St. Petersburg, but the Tsar’s government only 
regained control with the introduction of large numbers of Russian troops who took time 
to mobilize and arrive on station. In the interim period, the Baltic Germans were forced to 
hold their own. Order was not restored until December. The Revolution of 1905 lasted 
throughout the entire year in the Baltic territories. 
The Tsar and the Baltic Germans cooperated in putting down the 1905 
Revolution. Punitive expeditions were dispatched by St. Petersburg and were assisted by 
local Baltic Germans who pointed out who their targets should be. Much destruction of 
Latvian life and property ensued. A similar story played out in Estonia, although the 
bloodletting was not quite as severe. 
 
World War One and the War of Independence 
 At the outbreak of the First World War, many Baltic Germans served in the 
Tsarist Army against German troops from the Kaiserreich. Because of their 
socioeconomic background, Baltic Germans were disproportionately represented in the 
officer corps. It seems that when the Russians began to lose badly, many either switched 
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sides or deserted. In 1917, prominent Baltic Germans even approached the Kaiser seeking 
to add the annexation of the Baltic territories in the form of the abortive “United Baltic 
Duchy” to the German war aims – a lobbying effort that, regardless of how seriously it 
was taken by the German government itself – not very – is a damning testimony to their 
relations with Latvians and Estonians.66 
In the chaos of the Russian Civil War between the Reds and the Whites, Latvians 
declared an independent state on 18 November 1918. There was open warfare between 
Estonians and Latvians allied against the Baltic Germans’ Baltische Landeswehr, German 
Freikorps freebooters, and associated Russian White reactionaries. This fighting 
continued for an entire year. The Latvians, Estonians, and remaining German forces then 
united in the face of the Red Army, which they repelled in 1920. By this time, everyone 
was tired of fighting, apparently, because they stopped.  
 
Minority in Free States, 1920 – 1934  
Especially in light of their perfidious plans to have Latvia and Estonia annexed to 
the Kaiserreich and their support of Freikorps depredations, what happened to the Baltic 
Germans during Latvia’s independence – and what did not happen to them – is quite 
remarkable. This minority had actively been killing Latvians and Estonians and had been 
deliberately acting to prevent Latvian and Estonian independence not only in the dim fog 
of remote antiquity, but within everyone’s living memory. 
 Latvian minority policy actually showed extraordinary forbearance and an 
understanding of the need for coexistence in the initial, parliamentary phase. While of 
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course punishing guilty individuals severely, Latvia’s parliament, the Seima, refrained 
from punitive measures against the group as a whole.67 They were citizens. They could 
vote. 
Land reform was the harshest or most hard-hitting policy, and the one the Baltic 
Germans complained the most loudly about. The breakup and parceling out of the 
anachronistic and inefficient large estates would probably have eventually occurred 
according to the dictates of economics, and it far from utterly dispossessed the rural 
Baltic Germans. Still, these properties were regarded as ancient birthrights, and the policy 
rankled. 
 In the cities and larger towns, Baltic Germans had their own German-language 
schools. They were allowed to serve in the Latvian armed forces and their veterans 
received the same pensions as ethnic Latvians. Every week, German-language sermons 
were delivered in the Dom Cathedral, Rīga’s largest. Baltic Germans were fairly 
represented in the universities. They were also able to form all manner of cultural and 
political groups through which to protect their rights. 
 There were, of course, exceptions to the general rule of Latvian tolerance. A 
radical Latvian nationalist group called the Perkonkrūsts, or Thundercross, hated the 
Baltic Germans even more than they hated the Russian Communists. The Latvian public, 
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however, though its representative institutions, appears to have largely given its assent to 
their government’s basically benign policy towards the Baltic German minority.  
 
Minority Under Dictatorship, 1934 – 1939  
Even under the so-called ‘benevolent dictator’ Kārlis Ulmanis, from 1934 until 
the takeover by the Soviet Union in 1939, Baltic Germans could hardly complain of 
widespread discrimination, much less the real sort of persecution that ethnic minorities 
faced in Romania, Lithuania, or, say, Germany. Ulmanis, for example, banned the radical 
nationalist group Perkonkrūsts, and otherwise tried to avoid drawing the attention of the 
Third Reich. There was still plenty of xenophobic nationalist rhetoric in the air, but this 
was Eastern Europe in the 1930s.68  
 For their part, however, the Baltic Germans showed increasing sympathy for 
Hitler and the Third Reich, especially among the youth, which only knew growing up as 
a minority in coutries in which they had little say in politics or the economy.69 They were 
the only subset of the Baltic German population that strongly favored Hitler, impressed as 
they were, no doubt, by his foreign policy achievements and rhetoric about a united 
Germandom. It should also be remembered here, that in the context of the worldwide 
economic Depression, many young, male Baltic Germans emigrated in search of work, 
thus reducing further their proportion of the population. However, popular support for the 
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National Socialists was never particularly strong in Latvia, and certainly did not approach 
the level of organized agitation of, say, the Sudeten Germans.70 The Baltic German 
population according to the 1935 census stood at 62,144, or 3.19% of Latvia’s total 
population.71 Estonia’s Baltic German population was less than a quarter of that of 
Latvia, and made up an even smaller proportion of the total population.  
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III. UMSIEDLUNG 
 It is vital to remember that the movement of the Baltic Germans took place in 
three waves – 1939/40, 1941, and 1944/45 – and that the nature and the content of these 
migrations changed over time. The relatively orderly, largely ideologically inspired 
immigration and resettlement in 1939/40 changed to the hasty departure of refugees 
evacuating Soviet-occupied Latvia in 1941, and finally mass flight before the resurgent 
Red Army in 1944/45.  
One useful source – but one which must be used carefully – for information about 
the attitudes of the Baltic Germans themselves towards the first resettlement is the 
collection of interviews compiled in 1958 and 1959 by the German Federal Archives, in 
association with the Baltic Historical Commission. Most of the 50 or so interviewees 
were males who were prominent in Baltic German society at the time and who assisted 
the National Socialists in the resettlement effort.72 Some even became Party members. 
Their comments must be weighed accordingly, but are nevertheless a tempting source for 
insights into the mentality of the Baltic Germans and the Zeitgeist.  
 Strikingly, almost every interviewee independently introduced the topic of the 
Reichstag speech given by Hitler on 6 October 1939 with which this paper opened – and 
said that it was a bolt from the blue. One Baltic German youth leader, who was 
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presumably a Movement stalwart, related that “I also found it very difficult, that an old, 
culturally European land, a land in which the Germans had, for centuries been the leading 
strata and that in many respects bore a German face, just simply with a few words and 
with the stroke of a quill was relinquished.”73 He was far from alone, if the interviewees 
are to be believed. According to another: “The selling out of the Baltics to the 
Bolsheviks, I viewed as Hitler betraying the West.”74 There was real disillusionment, real 
disappointment. Another said: “I have to say personally that [the news] affected me like a 
blow from a club.”75 Even committed National Socialist Baltic Germans had grave 
doubts as to the wisdom of the resettlement. A member of the Praesidium of the 
Volksgemeinschaft, the National Socialist proxy organization in Estonia, said 14 years 
later: “My family and I were naturally appalled.”76 A youth activist said: 
Yes, I am one of those who belonged to the [National Socialist] Movement, who 
very openly worked for it, and belonged at that time with the leadership of the 
youth, this mobilized youth. The news of the resettlement hit me with a terrible 
shock. I was altogether distressed. I wrote in my diary at the time this comparison: 
everything for which we had lived dissolved like a snowman we made as children 
melting in the spring. I naturally thought about everything our ethnic group had 
established in the course of 700 years, and how it was to disappear, just like a 
melting snowman. And the question: Has all of this been to any significance, have 
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these many generations who spent their lives for this land lived to any purpose, is 
not their entire meaning shattered by this resettlement?...These were the most 
difficult hours of my life, where I had to come to terms with the resettlement.77 
 
And yet another said, “The reaction to the news, that the resettlement of the east German 
ethnic splinters referred also to us, was consternation, absolute consternation.”78 This 
theme – that the speech was entirely unanticipated by all but perhaps the very highest-
level Baltic Germans to whom forewarning was apparently given in strictest confidence 
by Reich agents – pervaded the entire collection of interviews.  
In the telling of the story, many Baltic Germans after the war couched their 
decision to resettle as no real decision at all, because there was also fear. The Soviet 
threat, in these narratives, was so great and so obvious that remaining behind was seen as 
suicide: 
The situation was so clear-cut that there was no further need to question why I am 
participating in the resettlement, which ideational motives are causing me to. 
Rather, it was simply the preservation of physical existence... Others may have 
more or less followed from purely National Socialist motives without any doubts 
about the resettlement. All of these different groups... the absolute primary 
question: to remain and be Bolshevized, or to go to Germany.79 
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Other Baltic Germans were able to find other ways to rationalize their decision to 
resettle. For example: “I am of the opinion that wars have the peculiarity of accelerating 
developments that are at hand. Seen this way, the resettlement of the German Balts out of 
Estonia [and Latvia] was a premature, but inevitable, conclusion, sooner or later, of a 
history of many hundreds of years, which we truly need not be ashamed of.”80 
The period was full of turmoil for the Baltic Germans, and rumors flew. In the 
unstable international situation, the Baltic Germans were reminded of the violence 
between themselves and the Latvian and Estonian populations only two decades before. 
Fear of being ethnically cleansed had some currency. 
The German envoy didn’t seem to consider this atmosphere of panic unjustified 
and unfounded, but asked us to consider what [else, other than resettlement 
elsewhere] one could do to rescue the German population. He saw the situation 
thusly: that probably Russian troops would march in, but before they would be 
able to occupy the land, there would be an interregnum during which the mob 
would control the country.81 
 
This view was perhaps held by a tiny minority of Baltic Germans, and there is 
even some reason to believe that National Socialist functionaries were responsible for 
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introducing the idea into the discourse as a means of frightening the Baltic Germans into 
compliance. However, the rumor mill of the Baltic Germans did not even exclude such 
heresies as the following: “...the opinion that Hitler had actually only expressed a wish of 
Stalin” when he ordered the Baltic Germans to leave Latvia and Estonia. “Whether or not 
that’s true, I don’t know.”82 
For many Baltic Germans, the actual moment of departure was the most difficult 
emotionally  – probably much more difficult than the actual question of whether to stay 
or go. “They [the Estonians] saw the danger from the East...They understood how badly 
we felt to abandon Estonia. It was actually so, that when we boarded our ship in Reval to 
leave our homeland and Deutschland über Alles followed immediately by the Estonian 
national anthem were played – many broke into tears.”83 
 If postwar accounts are to be believed, even staunch supporters of the National 
Socialists had grave misgivings about the resettlement project, although they ultimately 
obeyed. Latvian and Estonian pressure was virtually nonexistent at either the 
governmental or popular levels. It should also be remembered that, under the provisions 
of the treaties signed between Germany and Latvia and Estonia, any Baltic Germans 
choosing to remain behind would no longer enjoy collective political rights as a protected 
minority in those countries. The pull of so many Baltic Germans eventually deciding to 
opt for resettlement, coupled with the push of the knowledge of becoming more isolated 
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and vulnerable as an even smaller minority in Latvia and Estonia probably swayed many 
of those who sitting on the fence. By far the single most important push factor behind it 
all, however, was fear of the Soviet threat. 
 
The Moving Process During the First Resettlement 
The state-owned media praised a smoothly executed and streamlined, modern 
resettlement process and insisted on strict ‘message control.’84 The reality was, 
predictably, rather less rose-colored, both for the state and party functionaries charged 
with executing it, and for the Baltic Germans themselves, albeit for different reasons.  
Almost immediately, the National Socialists’ vision collided with reality. To 
begin with, the ‘racially pure’ group turned out to be a far cry from the superior ‘human 
material’ the National Socialists had fantasized about finding in the Baltic Germans.85 
The demographic makeup of the Baltic Germans did not compare favorably with that of 
the Reich in terms of proportions of fighting and working-age men. As already 
mentioned, statistics compiled on the settlers revealed that of a total of 61,934 potential 
settlers, only 27,433, or 44.29% were male.86 And from that number could be deducted a 
high percentage who were too old to work or fight. Indeed, the population also had a 
significantly disproportionate number of elderly people, particularly women aged 50 and 
                                                 
84
 BAB. R69/1130. 1. Einwandererzentralstelle Gotenhafen. SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Sandberger. An das 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Betr.: Propagandistische Behandlung der Baltenaktion.” 15.10.1939. Point 
number one was: “To prevent the arrival of foreign journalists.” “Ankunft von Auslandsjournalisten zu 
verhindern.” 
 
85
 “Menschenmaterial,” or “human material” was a term in common usage to describe people and 
communities, in nakedly utilitarian terms, as to their potential use to the state. 
 
86
 NARA II. T 74. R 16. RDV. 127. 387899. Der Reichsführer SS. Reichskommissar für die Festigung 
deutschen Volkstums. Der Menscheneinsatz: Grundsätze, Anordungen, und Richtlinien. “Zahlenangaben 
über die einzelnen Umsiedlergruppen.” 15. Oktober 1940. “Estland: insgesamt: 12,868 männlich: 5,892 
weiblich: 34,501; Lettland: insgesamt: 49,066 männlich: 21,541 weiblich: 27,525; Est- und Lettland: 
insgesamt: 61,934 männlich: 27,433 weiblich: 34,501.” 
 41 
 
 
up.87 To National Socialist thinking, such people could not fight, labor, or breed and thus, 
especially in wartime, were ‘useless mouths.’ Just as disappointing, if not even more so, 
was the unexpectedly high percentage of Baltic Germans who were sick or disabled. 
 According to EWZ evaluators, there was “an exceptionally high percentage of 
sick people and invalids among the Baltic group.”88 It appears that the EWZ was so 
under-prepared to care for all of these sick individuals that it was compelled to request 
medical resources from the Wehrmacht.89 Among the elderly were many suffering from 
heart conditions, diabetes, and angina. Also, cases of flu, bronchitis, diphtheria, 
“nutritional disturbances,” measles, and almost a dozen suspected cases of scarlet fever 
were found among young Baltic German children.90 
Curiously, a special transport seems to have been organized for several hundred 
Baltic Germans suffering from mental illnesses. Among them were cases of dementia 
senilis, schizophrenia, psychosis, “idiocy,” epilepsy, “mania,” organic brain damage, and, 
perhaps not surprisingly, depression. Not to be excluded were two full-blown 
psychopaths.91 It is ironic that the apparatus would have bothered transporting and 
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 See the chart in: BAB. R 69/1021. 25. “Der Altersaufbau der bis einschl. 31.1.1940 erfasster 
Rückwanderer aus Est- und Lettland und des Deuschen Reichs (Altes Reichsgebiet mit ehem. Österreich; 
Stand vom 1.1.1939). 31.1.1940. 
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 BAB. R 69/646. 5. “Der Verbindungsführer bei der Gauleitung Pommern. An die 
Einwandererzentralstelle Gotenhafen und an das Einsatzkommando VI mit der Bitte um Weiterleitung an 
SS,-Stubaf. Tschierschky zu Kenntnisnahme an Sicherheitshauptamt III E S. Betr.: Underbringung der 
Kranken und Gebrechlichen im Gau Pommern. 31. Oktober 1939. “...eines besonders hohen Prozentsatzes 
von Kranken und Gebrechlichen bei den Baltischen Volksgruppen.” 
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 BAB. R 69/646. 6. “Der Verbindungsführer bei der Gauleitung Pommern. An die 
Einwandererzentralstelle Gotenhafen und an das Einsatzkommando VI mit der Bitte um Weiterleitung an 
SS,-Stubaf. Tschierschky zu Kenntnisnahme an Sicherheitshauptamt III E S. Betr.: Underbringung der 
Kranken und Gebrechlichen im Gau Pommern.” 31. Oktober 1939. 
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 BAB. R 69/728. 20-23. “Erkrankte Baltendeutsche in Posener Krankenhäuser.” 13.11.39. 
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 BAB. R 69/1015. 1-8. 
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processing these individuals even as, simultaneously, the regime was preparing to kill 
such people living in the Reich as “life unworthy of life” under the auspices of the T4 
“euthanasia” program. Local German operatives involved in the resettlement would not 
have had knowledge of the T4 program, however. It is also possible that the families of 
these individuals and perhaps even the Latvian government insisted that they be included 
in the resettlement operation. At higher levels of the SS, the decision to transport such 
people may have been considered a useful smokescreen for the T4 program or it may 
simply have been a public relations decision. Their fate is unknown. 
At least one Baltic German actually died during transport. The steamship Steuben, 
arriving at the port of Stettin on 9 November 1939, brought settlers from Riga, Mitau, 
Dünaburg, and Wolmar.92 Typically, these included 845 men, 1,350 women, 607 children 
aged 1-15, and 72 nursing infants. Among them, 66 individuals were classified as sick. 
One corpse was also aboard. After disembarkation, four rail transports took them to 
Posen, where they were to be temporarily housed in two schools.93  
A Latvian contemporary, who spent the war in exile in America, claimed in late 
1944 that the Baltic Germans, on arriving in occupied Poland, immediately realized that 
they had made a mistake and renamed Gotenhafen, their main port of call, “Totenhafen,” 
or “harbor of the dead. In contrast, Latvia, or Lettland, was remembered by the resettlers 
as “Fettland,” or “fat land.”94 
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 That is, Rīga, Jelgava, Daugavpīls, and Valmiera – all cities in Latvia. 
 
93
 BAB. R 69/1127. 141. “Information. Posen.” 10.11.1939. This was not uncommon. Before their ultimate 
settlement in apartments or on farms, most Baltic Germans awaited their processing in schools, dormitories, 
athletic gymnasia, and other large public facilities, sleeping on floors with few hot meals. 
 
94
 Alfreds Bilmanis. “Grandeur and Decline of the German Balts.” Slavonic and East European Review. 
American Series, Vol. 3, No. 4. (Dec., 1944), p. 77. 
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Yet the first resettlement was carried out as a model resettlement in as humane a 
fashion as possible. Several striking snapshots will suffice to demonstrate that the 
National Socialists conducted this population transfer like none other. 
Impatiently awaiting early reports on the progress of the transportation of the 
Baltic Germans, SS-Sturmbannführer Tschierschky at the EWZ headquarters, which was 
still in Posen at the time, wrote: “The arrival of the animal transports is to be reported on 
next. When, for example, did the dog transport enter port?”95 The transportation of 
sizeable numbers of farm animals that had economic utility, such as cattle, might be 
expected. But this document indicates that care was even taken to ensure the safe 
transport of the Baltic Germans’ pets. 
 As the settler families were being allotted their new homes, the Ostdeutscher 
Beobachter regularly ran a column listing unclaimed luggage items and maintained an 
office where the articles could be claimed between 10AM and 1 PM on weekdays. The 
descriptions were most detailed, listing baggage dimensions and contents in precise 
detail.96 
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 BAB. R 69/1127. 245. “Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. Einwandererzentralstelle Nordost, 
Posen. An die Einwndererzentralstelle, Nebenstelle Stettin. Betr.: Namens- und Unterkunftslisten kranker 
Baltendeutscher.” 8.12.39. “Auch über eintreffende Tiertransporte ist fortlaufend zu berichten. Wann sind 
z.B. Hundetransporte eingelaufen?” 
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 For example, BAB. R 69/1027. “Wer vermiβt Umsiedlergepäck? Auskunft durch die Volksdeutsche 
Mittelstelle, Posen.” Ostdeutscher Beobachter, 30.12.1940. Entry number 160 on the list is recorded as: “1 
Koffer, 76x44x43 Zentimeter, mit 2 Bandeisen verschlossen. Inhalt: 1 gefütterte Pelzmütze, 1 weiβe Weste 
mit 4 Perlmutterknöpfchen, 1 Frackweste, 1 Jackett mit 1 Abzeichen, 1 schwarzes Jackett, 1 Frack u. a. 
Kleidungsstücke, Bettwäsche, gez. “E. v. B.”, 6 Silberne Eβlöffel, gez “R. v. B.”, 6 Teelöffel (Silber), “R. 
v. B.”, 7 geblümte tiefe und 1 Frühstücksteller, gez. “Jardiniere B. & B.”, 2 Dokumente aus 
Pergamentpapier mit einem Siegel versehen, beginnend mit “Wir, Walter von Plettenburg...” und “Wir, 
Hermann von Bruggnen, genannt Hasenstamp”, 2 Hammer und 1 Kneifzange.” The presence of valuable 
silver items on the list suggests that theft on the part of officials, at least, was not a widespread occurrence 
during the resettlement.  
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 There were approximately 400 or 500 Baltic German university students who 
were among the settlers.97 Since they represented such a concentrated population, 
centering in Riga and Tallinn, they were apparently brought to occupied Poland together 
as a group, rather than with their families, and were settled directly into “former” Polish 
dormitories.98 Remaining among friends, one can imagine the settlement, from their 
perspective, being an adventure rather than an ordeal.99 
Also, all of the sick Baltic Germans were to be kept in the presence of familiar 
faces. “It remains our intention that invalids who are accompanied by healthy family 
members who are able to take them along, be routed directly to Posen, in order not to 
separate them unnecessarily.”100 
  In addition to human beings, provisions were also later made to transport to 
occupied Poland and thus preserve Baltic German cultural artifacts. “At the Reich archive 
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 BAB. R 69/100. 27. “Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. Einwandererzentralstelle Nord-Ost, Posen. 
An Herrn Dr. Streit, Beauftragten des Reichserziehungsministers und des Reichsstudentenführers für den 
Warthegau. Betr.: Unterbringung für die baltendeutschen Studenten in Posen.” 19.Nov.1939. 
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 BAB. R 69/1127. 270. “Der Universitätsbeauftragte des Reichstattthalters. Der Bevollmächtigte des 
Reichsstudentenführers. An den Leiter der Einwanderer-Zentralstelle Nosd-Ost SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. 
Sandberger. Betr.: Unterbringung der baltendeutschen Studenten in Posen. 27.11.1939. “...bisherige 
polnischen Studentenheime...” 
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 It is also appropriate to point out that, generationally, a far higher proportion of the Baltic German youth 
had been supportive of the National Socialist regime and its ideology than any other compact segment of 
the Baltic German population. One can imagine the awe in which some of them would have been when 
confronted with this tangible manifestation of the might of the National Socialist state. Swept from Latvia 
and Estonia and installed in a new university overnight – and one in an occupied country at that, freshly 
defeated by German arms. 
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 BAB. R 69/646. 5. “Der Verbindungsführer bei der Gauleitung Pommern. An die 
Einwandererzentralstelle Gotenhafen und an das Einsatzkommando VI mit der Bitte um Weiterleitung an 
SS,-Stubaf. Tschierschky zu Kenntnisnahme an Sicherheitshauptamt III E S. Betr.: Underbringung der 
Kranken und Gebrechlichen im Gau Pommern. 31. Oktober 1939. “Es ist jedoch nach wie vor vorgesehen, 
daβ Gebrechliche, die mit gesunden Familien mitkommen und von diesen unbedingt weiter mitgenommen 
werden können, direkt nach Posen weitergeleitet werden, um die Familien nicht unnötigerweise zu 
trennen.” It is jarring to see examples such as these in which the SS attempts to treat human beings like 
human beings. Of course, the whole project was fundamentally inhumane, and the people who the Baltic 
Germans were displacing could tell stories of their own about the SS’s ‘humane’ methods. This will be 
discussed below. 
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in Posen, in agreement with the Reichsführer SS as the Reichskommissar for the 
Strengthening of Germandom, a special Baltic German division will be established.”101 
In a postwar interview, one Baltic German who had participated in the preservation of 
Baltic German material culture had the following to say about the enterprise: “During the 
resettlement all of these cultural goods, primarily pictures and archives, sculptures and a 
quantity of other assorted things that really couldn’t be counted as cultural goods since 
there was also some kitsch.”102 
 
Classification Schema 
The National Socialists’ proclivity for establishing hierarchies everywhere they 
cast their gaze is notorious. Finding the ethnic Germans they encountered anything but 
uniform and homogenous, they deemed a system of categorization necessary. So it was 
with their classification of the Baltic Germans. These classifications were the first step in 
the disintegration of the Baltic Germans. Applying political and ‘racial’ criteria, Baltic 
German settlers were placed into a category, I – IV, according to evaluations by the 
separate Health and Citizenship departments of the EWZ and the opinion of officials 
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 BAB. R 69/1027. 39. “Baltendeutsche Kulturgüter. Sammlung durch das Posener Reichsarchiv.” 
Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, Abendausgabe. 1.2.1941. “Bei dem Reichsarchiv in Posen wird im Einvernehmen 
mit dem Reichsführer SS als Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums eine besondere 
baltendeutsche Abteilung eingerichtet.” 
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 LAA. Ost-Dok. 14/3. “Die Umsiedlung der Baltischen Volksgruppe zu Beginn des 2. Weltkrieges. 
Tonbandaussage. Herrn Otto Eckert. Delegationsführer der Delegation zur Umsiedlung der Kulturgüter aus 
den drei Baltischen Staaten,” p. 8. “Während der Umsiedlung wurden nun diese ganze Kulturgüter, 
hauptsächlich Bilder und Archivalien, Skulpturen und eine Menge verschiedenartiger Dinge, die nicht 
einmal als zum Kulturgut zu rechnen waren, weil da auch Kitsch dabei war.” For a more recent assessment 
of Baltic German material culture, see: Helena Simkuva. “Cultural and Historical Heritage of Baltic 
Germans in Latvia: Research Results and Prospects,” in The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads: 
Political, Economic and Legal Problems. 2nd Ed. Talavs Jundzis, ed. Riga: National Academy of Sciences, 
2001. pp. 405-26. 
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from the Race and Settlement Office.103 Decisions were made not for individuals but for 
entire families. Based on its category, each family was either rejected outright (S-Cases), 
assigned for ‘re-Germanization’ in the Reich (A-Cases), or designated as ready for 
settlement in the East (O-Cases). These last were the most German, and hence the most 
trustworthy and valuable, to the reckoning of the panels. Because of this classification 
scheme, most but not all of the first wave of settlers were placed in the Warthegau.104 The 
evaluation and processing, dubbed “Durchschleusung,” or ‘sluicing through, occurred all 
at once and usually took only several hours. Individuals filed past a battery of stations, 
each one representing another aspect of the information gathering and assessment 
process, from the value of immovable property a settler left behind to the color of the 
settler’s eyes.105 
Nothing involving the transfer of 60,000 human beings from one country to 
another over the course of a couple of weeks can possibly go off without any bizarre 
situations arising, and there were some hiccups. The example of the Baltic Germans of 
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 Disappointingly, the RKFDV’s Menscheneinsatz bulletin for 1940 does not seem to contain these 
guidelines. However, their application is universally attested to, however. They were never fundamentally 
altered although, as will be seen later, they were slightly tweaked for each ethnic German group. 
 
104
 Probably fewer than 10% were sent to the Reich – mainly sick and elderly people and, occasionally, 
their families. It should also be pointed out that these classifications really meant something. In the context 
of World War Two German-occupied Europe, it could determine how much food your life was worth to the 
National Socialist state. To be considered Volksdeutsche was to be fed like Reichsdeutsche. BAB. R 
69/414. 54. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Völkische Schutzarbeit. An die Betreuungsstelle für 
Volksdeutsche. Betr.: Lebensmittelkarten für Volksdeutsche.” 29. September 1942. “Today we have come 
to find out from the Reich Economic Ministry, that in the next few days an ordinance will be enacted, 
whereby ethnic Germans will be provided not foreign civilian workers’ rations, but normal rations, i.e. they 
will be treated as normal consumers.” “...wir vom Reichswirtschaftsministerium heute erfahren haben, dass 
in den nächsten Tagen ein Erlass herausgegeben wird, wonach Volksdeutsche nicht die für ausländische 
Zivilarbeiter vorgesehenen Wochenkarten erhalten, sondern normale Lebensmittelkarten bekommen, d.h. 
wie Normalsverbraucher behandelt werden.” 
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 See Appendix A: Departmental Organization of the Einwandererzentralstelle During Durchschleusung, 
and Appendix B: The Main Assignments of the Einwandererzentralstelle for more detail. 
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English citizenship is interesting and sheds light on the relative importance, in the minds 
of the SS, of political versus ‘racial’ criteria.  
On the advice of the Army High Command, the naturalization of citizens of 
enemy states (especially England), who are to arrive here in upcoming Baltic 
German transports in a strength of a total of 60 persons, is absolutely undesirable. 
Their naturalization is at this time to be deferred, even if those persons have a 
certificate of being ethnic German. Under no circumstances should these people 
be allowed to become aware of this command. It is requested that in such cases, 
the UWZ leader in Posen be informed in writing.106 
 
 In another bizarre example, 25 Baltic Germans convicts who had been in Latvian 
and/or Estonian prisons were processed and awarded Reich citizenship.107  
There was a minority of Baltic Germans who did not take the opportunity to 
resettle in the winter of 1939-40. This newspaper report filed from Rīga after the 
completion of the resettlement is typical: 
“German is hardly ever heard on the streets anymore. At most, similar sounds 
greet the ear: It is Jews, fiddling their corrupted jargon...All told, 90% of all 
Germans in Latvia followed the call of the Führer...A visit to the ethnic renegade 
in holy vestments, one Pastor Grass, was a tragicomic interlude...This Pastor, at 
that time, unfurled his counter-propaganda against our people...[Nevertheless] 
The stroke [i.e. the resettlement] will be final.”108 
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 BAB. R 69/560. 072. “Organisation. An die Staatsangehörigkeitsstelle, im Hause.” 2.Dezember 1939. 
“Nach Mitteilung des Oberkommandos des Heeres ist eine Einbürgerung von Staatsangehörigen von 
Feindstaaten (insbesondere England), die in nächster Zeit mit baltendeutschen Transporten etwa in einer 
Stärke von insgesamt 60 Personen hier ankommen sollen, durchaus unerwünscht. Es sollen diese 
Einbürgerungen zunächst zurückgestellt werden, auch wenn diese Personen eine Bescheinigung der 
deutschen Volksgruppe haben. Es darf jedoch diesen Personen in keiner Weise diese Anordnung zur 
Kenntnis kommen. Beim Vorliegen eines solchen Falles wird gebeten dem Leiter der 
Einwandererzentralstelle Posen schriftlich zu berichten.” 
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 BAB. R 69/280. 020. “Fernschreiben. Einwanderernebenstelle Posen. An den Höhere SS- und 
Polizeiführer Ostsee. Betr.: Baltendeutsche Strafgefangene.” 15. Mai 1940. The crimes of the prisoners 
were not specified in the document. 
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 BAB. R 69/1027. 52. “Lettland nach Abzug der Deutschen.” Frankfurt. Oder-Zeitung. 8.1.1940. 
“Deutsch wird auf der Straβe kaum noch gehört, höchstens ähnliche Laute bringen an das Ohr: Es sind 
Juden, die ihren korrumpierten Jargon mauscheln...Insgesamt sind 90 v. D[?]. aller Deutschen in Lettland 
dem Rufe des Führers gefolgt...Ein tragikomisches Zwischenspiel bedeutete der Besuch eine völkischen 
Renegaten im geistlichen Gewande (vestments), eines Pastor Graβ... Dieser Pastor hatte seinerzeit eine 
Gegenpropaganda gegen die Volksgruppe entfaltet...Schluβstrich soll endgültig sein.” 
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Pastor Grass became well known as an infamous figure in the state-controlled 
German press, a boogeyman of sorts, and a symbol race treachery. He is even mentioned 
by name in postwar interviews, although he is dismissed as an exception who came to 
symbolize the vanishingly small proportion of Baltic Germans who did not resettle.109 It 
should be pointed out that the interviewees have their own reasons to dismiss those who 
stayed behind as insignificant. In actual fact, fully ten percent of the Baltic Germans 
opted to stay behind in the winter of 1939/40, as the article surprisingly admits. Because 
of the notoriety awarded him in the National Socialist press and his ‘reactionary’ views, it 
is likely that Soviet authorities later murdered or deported Pastor Grass. 
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 See, for example: LAA. Ost-Dok. 14/7. “Die Umsiedlung der Baltischen Volksgruppe zu Beginn des 2. 
Weltkrieges. Tonbandaussage. Dr. jur. Edgar Schwarz.” 12. Oktober 1958. 
  
IV. NACHUMSIEDLUNG 
The Baltic Germans departed Latvia and Estonia for the Reich in two separate 
waves. The first, which has been described above, occurred during the winter of 1939-40. 
The second occurred in the spring of 1941 and involved the resettlement of 
approximately 20,000 persons. By the end of the Nachumsiedlung, almost no Baltic 
Germans remained in Latvia or Estonia who had had any opportunity to leave. Joining 
them were numbers of Latvians and Estonians who were accepted as “Baltic Refugees,” 
who account for the apparent numerical desprepancy by which more ‘Baltic Germans’ 
were resettled than actually existed.110 
 
The Differences Between Umsiedler and Nachumsiedler 
These were the guidelines set down by Himmler for the evaluation of the 
Nachumsiedler. The categories were virtually identical to those applied to the original 
settlers, except that the original settlers were presumed to belong to Group 1 unless 
proven otherwise. 
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 German: Baltenflüchtlinge. 
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Group 1 consists of ethnic Germans who did not take part in the first resettlement, 
but who nevertheless have until now professed a positive attitude toward 
Germandom. 
Group 2 consists of ethnic Germans who until now have been politically 
indifferent, but have otherwise been known to be decent people. 
Group 3 consists of Latvians, Estonians, and other non-Germans. 
Group 4 consists of ethnic Germans and non-Germans who have political 
attachments [have anti-National Socialist political backgrounds] or are suspect, as 
well as those predisposed to criminality [asocials] (prostitutes, etc.).” 
Those belonging to Groups 1 and 2 will, immediately after their evaluation, be 
released from the camp and brought to their permanent work assignment once 
their work placement has been determined. 
Those belonging to Group 3 are, as long as the Chief of the Security Police and 
SD do not express any objections, to be as a rule deported back to Estonia or 
Latvia as appropriate. This will not apply to such persons as may express their 
wish to stay in the Altreich, and against whom there are no objections in racial, 
health, or other respects to permitting them to remain. In doubtful cases these 
persons are to be presented to the suitable examiner of the competent Higher SS 
and Police leader. 
Those belonging to Group 4 will be, according the results of their evaluation, 
remitted to the Security Police and the SD for eventual placement in a 
concentration camp.111 
 
Most of the Baltic Germans settled in the first action were virtually presumed to 
be O-Cases, as evidenced by their direct transportation to occupied Poland in preparation 
for immediate permanent resettlement. Not so those taking part in the Nachumsiedlung. 
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 NARA II. T 74. R 15. RDV 126. 387737. “Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums. 
Stabshauptamt. Der Menscheneinsatz: Grundsätze, Anordungen, und Richtlinien. Anordnung 43/AS: 
Einteilung der Flüchtlinge aus Estland und Lettland.” 4. August 1941. 
Gruppe 1 umfasst die Volksdeutschen, die sich zwar der ersten Umsiedlung nicht angeschlossen haben, die 
sich aber trotzdem bisher positiv zum Deutschtum bekannt haben. 
Gruppe 2 umfasst die Volksdeutschen, die bisher politische indifferent waren, sonst aber als anständige 
Menschen bekannt sind. 
Gruppe 3 umfasst die Letten, Esten und andere Fremdstämmige. 
Gruppe 4 umfasst die Volksdeutschen und Fremdstämmigen, die politisch belastet oder verdächtig sind, 
sowie die kriminell Vorbelasteten (Bordellmädchen usw.) 
Die Angehörigen der Gruppe 1 und 2 werden sofort nach der Überprüfung in denendgültigen [sic] 
Arbeitseinsatz gebracht und nach erfolgter Arbeitsvermittlung aus dem Lager entlassen. 
Die Angehörigen der Gruppe 3 sind, sofern der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD keine Bedenken 
äussert, grundsätzlich nach Estland oder bezw.Lettland abzuschieben. Dies gilt nicht für solche Personen, 
die den Wunsch äussern, im Altreich zu bleiben, und in rassischer, gesundheitlicher und anderer Hinsicht 
zu keinen Bedenken gegen ein Verblieben, im Altreich Anlass zu geben. In etwaigen Zweifelsfällen sind 
diese Personen dem Eignungsprüfer des zuständigen Höheren SS- und Polizeiführers zu Prüfung 
vorzuführen. 
Die Angehörigen der Gruppe 4 werden unter Vorlage des Überprüfungsergebnisses dem Chef der 
Sicherheitspolizei und des SD zur eventuellen Unterbringung in einem Konzentrationslager überwiesen.” 
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The Nachumsiedler – A-Cases almost by definition since they had either failed to show 
sufficient enthusiasm in their German-ness to apply for resettlement during the first 
action or else were ethnic Latvian or Estonian – found themselves distributed in camps all 
across the Reich, with the largest numbers in the Gaue of Mecklenburg (2,366) and 
Berlin (1,467). Only 1,376 were adjudged fit to be sent to the Wartheland. Close to 200 
others immediately joined the Wehrmacht.112 After their yearlong experience with the 
Soviets, many were probably desperately anti-Communist. 
 
Soviet Intimidation 
People were obviously desperate to leave Latvia and Estonia, as evidenced by the 
large numbers of applications to the German commission for participation in the Second 
Resettlement despite the obvious danger. In fact, in some ways, the operation resembled 
an evacuation. No one knew how long he or she would be trapped under Soviet 
occupation or that Operation Barbarossa was right around the corner. One list was 
compiled of 32 persons in Latvia who, after having been accepted for Nachumsiedlung in 
the Reich, were arrested by Soviet authorities. More than half of the names were German 
and almost all were residing in Riga. Most were arrested for reasons of espionage or 
counter-revolutionary activities.113 Their fates are unknown. 
The Soviets didn’t limit their targets of intimidation to those persons who were 
opting for Reich citizenship. Audaciously, they even attempted to threaten locals who 
were working with the German commission as volunteers: 
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 German: Nachumsiedler. Literally “after resettlers.” BAB. R 69/80. 023. “Verteilung der Balten 
flüchtlinge (ohne Lagerinsassen).”  
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 BAB. R 59/235. 5-7. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. Verzeichnis derjenigen Personen, die zur Umsiedlung 
ins Reich zugelassen sind, und inzwischen von dem Sowjetbehoerden verhaftet wurden Riga.” 29 Jan 1941. 
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On 26 February, Ms. Astrid Bladt (an assistant to the German district authority) 
was driving by taxi from the City Council Square on Ritter Street. She was 
followed by an NKVD car with two occupants. One of the occupants followed 
Ms. Bladt to Ritter Street 14, engaged her in conversation on the steps, and told 
her in Estonian: ‘Before you continue, you will certainly have something else to 
tell me.’ On the drive back, Ms. Bladt was escorted by a Russian car all the way 
to the office.114 
 
 
 
Red Army Soldiers 
Much to the embarrassment of Soviet officials, eleven Red Army soldiers 
attempted to register for the Nachumsiedlung. They were Baltic Germans who had been 
serving in the Latvian military when it was incorporated into the Soviet military.115 The 
Soviets placed every obstacle before them, and it appears that the German commission 
was unable to secure their departure.116 They must have known that they were risking 
their lives by applying. Their fates are also unknown. 
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 BAB. R 59/235. 40. Br/Bl. Aktenvermerk. Betr.: Belästigung einer Mitarteiterin (Durch NKWD 
Beamten. Reval.” 26. Februar 1941. “Am 26.Februar führt Flr. Astrid Bladt (Hilfskraft des Deutschen 
Gebietsbevollmächtigen) in einer Taxe vom Rathausplatz in die Ritter Strasse. Es folgt ihr ein NKWD 
Wagen, mit zwei Insassen, der hinter der Taxe anhält. Einer der Insassen folgt Frl. Bladt in die Ritterstr. 14, 
spricht sie auf der Treppe an, indem er ihr auf estnisch sagt: “bevor Sie fortfahren, werden Sie mir 
bestimmt noch etwas zu erzählen haben.” Auf der Rückfahrt wird Frl. Bladt bis vor die Dienststelle vom 
russ. Wagen begleitet.” Emphasis in original 
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 BAB. R 59/235. 9-10. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. Verzeichnis der optionswilligen Soldaten.” 31. 
Januar 1941. Riga. Their names were: Georg Kuehn, Oskar Buchrot, Helmut Zieber, Bruno Stein, Erich 
Grünau, Heins-Eduard Berg, Arthur Jakobson, Harry Wihtol, Harald Dupper, Ilmar Ruppner, and Eugen 
Rosenberg. These are obviously not Estonian, Latvian, or Russian names. 
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 BAB. R 59/235. 34. “Riga, den 15.Februar 1941.” “In further short discussions, the subject of the 
granting of leave for the soldiers who have applied for resettlement has been gone over again. On the 
German side, it is pointed out that the ethnic German soldiers have still further difficulties placed in their 
way.” “In weiteren kurzen Unterredungen wird noch einmal die Beurblaubung von Soldaten 
durchgesprochen, die sich zur Umsiedlung gemeldet haben. Es wird deutscherseits darauf hingewiesen, 
dass den volksdeutschen Soldaten noch weiterhin Schwierigkeiten in den Weg gelegt werden.” 
  
V. GETTING THROUGH THE WAR 
Life in the Camps 
Dozens of camps were set up in almost every district of the Altreich, including the 
Ostmark and Sudetenland, to accommodate the Nachumsiedler and the Baltic Refugees. 
These were not the kind of camps for which the National Socialist regime is now 
infamous. On the contrary, in these camps, the inhabitants were given adequate food, 
entertainment, and the ability to correspond with people outside the camp. They were 
internees insofar as were compelled to remain, on a temporary basis, until they had been 
processed and given work assignments and places to live. In the meantime, sport leagues 
and swimming activities were encouraged to keep the settlers healthy and amused while 
awaiting processing.117 The camps were also supplied with loaner radios from the 
Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.118 For the Baltic Germans and 
Baltic refugees still waiting placement half a year after they evacuated Latvia and 
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 BAB. R 59/78. 47. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Umsiedlung. Rundschreiben Nr. 11. An alle 
Einsatzführer. Betr.: Gesundheitliche Betreuung der Umsiedler in den Lagern durch Sport und Spiel.” 3. 
April 1941. 
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 BAB. R 59/78. 143. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Umsiedlung. Rundschreiben Nr. 61.” 8.Sep. 1941. 
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Estonia, VoMi organized camp Christmas parties with separate activities for children and 
for adults.119 Female settlers petitioned successfully in various camps to be allowed to 
assist in the preparation of meals.120 
To expedite their processing, the EWZ established “Flying Commissions” to 
travel to the camps scattered throughout the Altreich by bus and train. Six of these flying 
commissions were established in March 1940 to assist in the processing of the orginal 
Baltic German resettlers and other ethnic Germans, and their number was expanded after 
the Nachumsiedlung. The commissions had their own motor pool, since the camps were 
usually far from train tracks. They also enjoyed having their own “Sonderzug,” or special 
train, for rare cases. “Vorkommandos” would arrive at the camp first in order to set up 
the tables and equipment, such as cameras, and to provide general logistics. 
By February 1942, almost all of the Baltic Germans who still remained in the 
camps – approximately seven months after the Nachumsiedlung – were the elderly and 
others who were unable to work. These people were cared for. 
 Gottlieb Lutz, 62, and Helene Lutz, 75, and Anette Timberg, 72, Helene’s sister, 
wanted to be moved from the camps into a home together. Others, too, made requests. 
Alexander Palm, 82, wished to move to a home in Heidelberg because his children lived 
there. Sisters Helene and Julie Wann, aged 74 and 71, did not care where they were 
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 BAB. R 59/78. 228. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Umsiedlung D. Rundschreiben Nr. 105. An alle 
Einsatzführer. Betr.: Weihnachtsfeiern in den Lagern.” 10 Dezember 1941. 
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 BAB. R 59/78. 128. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Umsiedlung. Rundschreiben Nr. 53. Betr.: 
Zubereitung des Essens in den Lagern durch Umsiedlerfrauen.” 20.Aug.41. “With circular number 42 it 
was pointed out that the settler women were to be consulted as to the preparation of meals...The inspectors 
have determined that in several camps this directive is still being ignored and the settler women are still 
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hingewiesen, dass die Umsiedlerfrauen bei der Zubereitung des Essens heranzuziehen waren. Laut einer 
uns zugegangenen Mitteilung des Referates –J- haben die Inspekteure festgestellt, dass in mehreren Lagern 
dieser Hinweis unbeachtet blieb und die Umsiedlerfrauen nach wie vor bitten, bei der Zubereitung der 
Mahlzeiten herangezogen zu werden.” 
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moved, as long as they were moved together. Kurt Wilzing was only 8 years old, but his 
grandmother, Katherina Wilzing, 62, requested to be placed somewhere where she would 
be able to bring him up while he was going to school. There were many more cases.121 
 A testament to VoMi’s attention to detail and, one almost wants to say 
‘compassion,’ was its follow-up work. Rather than regard the Baltic Germans as “not our 
problem” after their processing and placement, VoMi kept tabs on its charges beyond the 
call of duty. For example, a scandal nearly erupted when VoMi learned that a retirement 
home to which it had sent several elderly female Baltic Germans was also used to 
rehabilitate Reichsdeutsch “asocials.” In a frantic and obsequious response to VoMi’s 
challenge, the regional director whose office was responsible for that particular facility 
wrote of his Baltic German charges: 
They live in bright, airy halls with a wonderful view of the home’s environs. 
None of the women have brought complaints. On the contrary, the condition of 
the beds, the good food, and the loving and humane treatment by the Sisters and 
the Head Mistress of the institution, as well as its scrupulous cleanliness are 
emphasized. 
 
The ‘asocial’ women who were also inmates at the same institution were kept 
separated from the others.122   
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 BAB. R 59/141. 29-30. “Landesfürsorgeverband Oberbayern. An die Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, 
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Discontent and 22 June 1941 
All of these efforts – on the part, no less, of SS institutions – to ameliorate the 
situation of the Baltic German Nachumsiedler did little to suppress their desire to 
eventually return home. The German invasion of the Soviet Union that commenced on 22 
June 1941 was a major turning point for everyone in the Third Reich, but for the Baltic 
Germans, this was especially momentous.123 The launching of the Barbarossa campaign 
and the rapid German conquest of Latvia and Estonia introduced a whole new dynamic in 
the Baltic Germans’ relationship with the Reich and the SS. Whereas the Umsiedler and 
the Nachumsiedler had up to that point been, if anything, grateful for the opportunity the 
Reich had given them to escape the Soviets, they now found themselves prisoners, after a 
fashion, of the very SS apparatus to which many believed, perhaps rightly, that they owed 
their lives. 
The widespread wish among the Baltic German resettlers to one day return to 
their “old Heimat,” which for them was not the “Fatherland,” quickly became apparent to 
worried and frustrated Reich authorities. The Baltic Germans were not behaving as they 
were supposed to. This perception of course deepened with the Wehrmacht conquest of 
Latvia and Estonia, when the pipedream of an eventual homecoming suddenly became a 
realistic prospect and the assumed primary reason for their original resettlement – the 
Soviet threat – was apparently removed. Almost exactly one month after the 
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 For their part, the Latvians and Estonians back home had problems of their own – German occupation. 
Latvians living in exile in the West and who were therefore free to speak, vilified the Baltic Germans in the 
blackest terms. It could not have helped the Latvian or Estonian attitude toward Baltic Germans when 
Alfred Rosenberg, a Baltic German from Tallinn who had immigrated to Germany in 1918, was given the 
position of Reichskommissar für das Ostland, Lord of Latvia, Estonia, and Beyond. Anti-German sentiment 
was high in general, and increasingly so as the war and occupation progressed. There was renewed anger at 
the Baltic Germans as the new occupation regime was equated with the historic German role in the region. 
In other words, the feeling was: The Germans are doing it to us again! For an interesting primary source 
explaining the Latvian attitude, written by Latvian exiles in the United States, see: Latvia Under German 
Occupation, 1941-1943. Washington, D.C.: Latvian Legation, 1943. 
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commencement of Operation Barbarossa, and two weeks after the conquest of Latvia and 
Estonia, it became necessary for Himmler, the man at the top, to issue a verdict on the 
question of allowing the settlers to return to their homes. He decreed: “a resettling of the 
Baltic States with settlers out of this land [the Warthegau] is fundamentally out of the 
question.”124 The SS had not just expended all that effort for nothing, and the 
ideologically motivated project would not be deterred by the desires of the Baltic 
Germans themselves, who were mere pieces on the board. 
The state-controlled press quickly moved to spread the information. The 
following response ran in the Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung, a daily that was read by 
the resettlers in the Warthegau: 
With the commencement of the struggle against Bolshevism and the liberation of 
the old German Hanseatic cities in Baltic territory, the question has emerged in 
circles of the Baltic German population settled in the Wartheland, if they might 
not resettle after the war in their liberated former homeland. To this, Gauleiter and 
Reichsstatthalter Greiser clarifies in a fundamental decree, that a resettlement of 
the Baltic Germans in the Baltic Sea provinces will not take place. A 700-year 
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 NARA II. T 74. R 15. RDV 126. 387753. “Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums. 
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litauischen Heimat erblicken können.” 
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chapter in the history of the Baltic Germans, far beyond the borders in advanced 
posts, is concluded by this war. The Baltic Germans have now been given the 
opportunity by the Führer to renew themselves and prove their high worth in the 
construction of the reconquered German core territory, that is to again be the 
breadbasket of the Reich.125 
 
National Socialist ideology fetishized the trope of the historical role of the Baltic 
Germans as warriors guarding the far-flung ethnic bastions in the East since the original 
Drang nach Osten. Despite this fantasy of timeless ethnic solidarity, the SS was 
apparently determined to end this “chapter.” Hitler had assigned them a new role in his 
designs for the East, and those who had been settled in the Warthegau with such effort 
and care were going to fulfill their role, their own personal desires notwithstanding. 
 This desire to return home was not only found amongst the Baltic Germans settled 
in the Warthegau, but also among the Nachumsiedler in camps in the Reich. The 
commandant of camp Felsenkeller in Thuringia wrote to his superiors at the EWZ 
headquarters to complain that the Nachumsiedler in his camp who had applied for 
permission to return to Latvia and Estonia still had not been issued the necessary 
identification papers to do so by the central authority in Litzmannstadt.126 They had been 
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 BAB. R 69/1027. 21. “Keine baltische Rücksiedlung!” Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung. 4.8.1941. 
“Mit dem Beginn des Kampfes gegen den Bolschewismus und der Befreiung der alten deutschen 
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 One caveat has to be added. From the context, it can’t be determined exactly what the commandant 
means by “Rückkehrausweis.” Sometimes, “Rückkehr” is used to refer to the ‘return’ of the Baltic 
Germans to the Reich. Sometimes it is used to refer to the return of the Baltic Germans from the Reich to 
Latvia and Estonia after Germany’s conquest of those countries. Individuals would need a 
“Rückkehrausweis,” as Baltic Germans, for legal employment in Germany. Yet, since returning to live in 
Latvia or Estonia was generally off-limits to Baltic Germans, a document granting permission to return 
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causing him a headache with their demands. He wanted their papers forthwith: “Thus, the 
settlers concerned, who have already been held in the camp for close to 16 months, can 
finally be discharged and get secure work and places to stay. I request that henceforward 
such matters will be settled earlier.”127 
There were efforts to publicly counteract the impression that the Baltic Germans 
were being held in the Warthegau increasingly against their will, and to demonstrate that 
they were enthusiastic participants in the schemes of the National Socialists. However, 
the very necessity of such propaganda suggests the opposite. Rumors that the Baltic 
German settlers, as a group, were uncommitted to National Socialist principles and only 
left their homes to escape likely Soviet aggression were in circulation. One effort to 
dispel this notion appeared as a letter to the editor in a local publication in the Warthegau. 
It is important that the ethnic Germans in Lodsch also learn how the Baltic 
Germans resettled, that on one word from the Führer they immediately packed 
their bags and returned to the Reich.  The view still persists to some degree that 
the Baltic Germans fled the Russians but that is not the case 
 
For emphasis, the author or authors ended their letter in the ‘German’ fashion: “Heil 
Hitler! The resettled Baltic Germans in Lodsch.”128 
                                                                                                                                                 
would also have to be issued – a “Rückkehrausweis.” It’s a conundrum. I believe the latter is what is being 
discussed here, because of the late date. I can’t see how it would be possible that 16 months after the 
Nachumsiedlung, anyone still didn’t have a job who needed one. But 16 months or so sounds like an 
appropriately long time to get a bureaucracy like the UWZ to allow you to do something it didn’t want you 
to do – such as return home. 
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der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD- Einwandererzentralstelle – Melde- und Ausweisstelle, Litzmannstadt. 
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 BAB. R 69/1027. 66. “Die Meinung des Lesers.” In what publication and on what date this letter was 
published is impossible to tell. “Die Baltendeutschen bitten, gütigt beifolgenden Artikel der ‘Revaler 
Zeitung’ Nr. 279 über die Umsiedlung der letzten Baltendeutschen auch in Ihrer Zeitung, deren 
Abonnenten wir jetzt sind, aufnehmen zu wollen. Es ist von Wichtigkeit, daβ auch die Volksdeutschen in 
Lodsch erfahren, wie die Baltendeutschen umsiedelten und auf ein Wort des Führers bin sofort ihre 
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 The authorship of the letter is very possibly spurious. By comparing the 
motivations and shared experiences of other ethnic Germans in Lodz with their own, the 
author or authors of this letter were attempting to equate the putative enthusiasm of other 
ethnic Germans to comply with National Socialist directives with themselves. A VoMi 
circular from August of 1941 informed the camp commandants thusly: 
Recently, there has been an increase in the number of cases in which applications 
from settlers wishing to return to the territories from which they came (and which 
are now under Wehrmacht occupation) have been submitted directly to us, over 
the heads of the Einsatzführung. Such applications, when received directly from 
settlers, have up to now been turned down. Because the volume of these requests 
will become stronger and more frequent, it is to be requested that the camp 
commandants be informed to the effect that a return of the settlers to their 
territory of origin is not to occur. If any setters are pigheaded and insist on their 
return, indicate it to the Processing Commission in cases in which they haven’t 
yet been processed. In cases in which their processing has already been carried 
out, the camp commandant will just have to mobilize all of his ability to make it 
clear to the settler that a return will not take place.129 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Köfferchen packten und in das groβe deutsche Vaterland zurückkehrten. Teilweise besteht noch die 
Ansicht, daβ die Baltendeutschen vor den Russen geflüchtet sind, daβ ist aber nicht der Fall. [Indem wir 
hoffen, daβ Sie unseren Wunsch erfüllen, zeichnen wir. Heil Hitler! Die umgesiedelten Baltendeutschen in 
Lodsch.” Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth at least pointing out here that there were 
significant tensions between different groups of resettled ethnic Germans. See, for example: LAA. Ost-
Dok. 8/456. “Die Ländische Siedlung im Wartheland: Die deutschen Massnahmen von 1939-1944. 
Hermann Deuz, ab 1943 kom. Hauptstableiter der Landesbauernschaft Waltheland.” 28.12.1955, p. 6. “Es 
gab auch Volksdeutsche die in dem Jahren 1940 usw die Meinung vertraten, dass der Einfluss der 
Baltendeutschen zu stark würde.”  
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 BAB. R 59/78. 127. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Umsiedlung. Rundschreiben Nr. 52. Betr.: Anträge 
von Umsiedlern auf Rückführung in die ehem. Aussiedlungsgebiete.” 20. Aug.41. “In letzter Zeit mehren 
sich die Fälle, dass Anträge von Umsiedlern direkt über die Einsatzführung uns vorgelegt werden mit der 
Bitte um Rückführung in die Gebiete, aus denen sie ausgesiedelt wurden, die aber jetzt von der Wehrmacht 
besetzt sind. Derartige Anträge, wenn sie von den Umsiedlern direkt gestellt werden, sind bisher abschlägig 
beschieden worden. Da der Anfall dieser Anfragen immer starker und grosser wird, darf gebeten werden, 
die Lagerführer dahingehend zu unterrichten, dass eine Rückführung der Umsiedler in die 
Aussiedlungsgebiete nicht stattfindet. Sollten einige Umsiedler starrköpfig sein und auf ihre Rückführung 
bestehen, so ware im Falle der noch nicht erfolgten Durchschleusung ein Hinweis der 
Durchschleusungskomjmission zu geben. In Falle der bereits erfolgten Durchschleusung muss der 
Lagerführer sein ganzes Können und Vermögen aufbieten, um den Umsiedlern klarzumachen, dass eine 
Rückführung nicht erfolgt.” 
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Occupations 
 According to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle’s main office for Völkische 
Schutzarbeit, “The goal must be to give the settlers a new feeling of being at home as 
well as occupational security, through which he will be put in a position to create a new 
existence for himself.”130 While this is a refreshingly humanitarian sentiment, the Reich 
of course had its own reasons for finding work for the Baltic Germans, and the Baltic 
Germans theirs. Namely: many Baltic Germans were able to thwart the RKFDV and 
associated entities by seeking the sponsorship of other National Socialist and German 
state organizations, thus parleying their skills into tickets back home. 
As part of their processing, data about the occupations of the settlers was 
collected. Before long, settlers were selected from such occupation lists in an attempt to 
fill occupational gaps in the German war economy. Most eager were the A-Cases: people 
who had been taken from their homes to listlessly fade away in inactivity in camps across 
the Reich.131 
 The job placement efforts of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, in cooperation with 
the various other relevant National Socialist professional associations and employment 
agencies, appears to have been conducted smoothly for those people involved in the 
Nachumsiedlung.132 The commandants in VoMi camps ensured that doctors registered 
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 BAB. R 69/414. 170. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Völkische Schutzarbeit. An den Gaubeauftragten 
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Diaries. Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2006. She and her mother were Group III (Baltic Refugees) who left Latvia 
during the Nachumsiedlung and opted to remain in Germany. 
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with the Reichsärztekammer in Berlin and their respective district offices in whichever 
Gau they were located.133 The same process took place with all specialized professions 
and technical jobs.134 
 The war effort also demanded skills that few besides the Baltic Germans could 
provide: trustworthy translators and interpreters for Estonia and Latvia. The Baltic 
Germans immediately grasped that this was an opportunity to take advantage of the 
wartime situation to escape the Warthegau and the camps. One Herr Wannag living in 
Lager Hellberg in Mecklenburg was advised: 
Now, after Riga and Latvia have been freed again from the Bolsheviks, it is 
probably to be assumed that some of our Germans from this territory will be 
needed to fill many posts. In case you still have not found an assignment by the 
time you receive this letter, I recommend that you apply to the Army High 
Command as an interpreter, since they always need people with knowledge of 
languages.135 
 
Herr Wannag was not ill informed. In fact, a message had been transmitted by 
VoMi in a circular as early as October of 1941 that “At the High Command of the Armed 
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 That is, at least relative to the nightmare scenarios experienced by ethnic Germans who entered the 
system later in huge numbers and sometimes wound up spending years sitting in a camp waiting for 
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Ungarn. Herrn Wilhelm Wannag.” 31.Juli.1941. “Jetzt, nachdem Riga und Lettland von den Bolschewiken 
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mit Sprachkenntnissen benötigt.” 
 63 
 
 
Forces is an urgent need of interpreters of Russian, who will be given assignments in 
POW camps in the Reich and in the newly conquered Eastern territories.”136 
Goebbels also needed bilingual personnel to help run his propaganda press in the 
occupied Baltic States.  
The Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda has turned to us 
with an urgent request to nominate one Baltic Nachumsiedler who speaks the 
Estonian language and three Baltic Nachumsiedlers who are proficient in the 
Latvian language, with possibility to act in a literary capacity. The employment 
by the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda presupposes 
that the Baltic Nachumsiedlers in question are in every respect reliable (Groups I 
and II), since they will be consulted in secret work.137 
 
  The Allgemeine-SS Command Office began by screening the camps in the Reich 
for A-Cases – the camps became a convenient site for recruiting manpower.138 Later, the 
SS became less forceful in its insistence that the O-Case families remain in the 
Warthegau. In such cases, the SS was robbing Peter to pay Paul. There are also strong 
indications that war-economic necessity quickly trumped the ideological resettlement 
project, since these people were, in effect, being taken out of the resettlement operation in 
favor of serving SS goals in other ways, especially in the Waffen-SS.  
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Männliche Angestellte für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda.” 23 April 42. “Das Reichsministerium für 
Volksaufklärung und Propaganda hat sich mit der dringenden Bitte hierher gewandt, ihm 1 
Baltennachumsiedler, der die estnische Sprache spricht und 3 Baltennachumsiedler, die die lettische 
Sprache beherrschen, zu benennen und die Möglichkeit bereits schriftstellerisch tätig waren. Der Einsatz 
beim Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda setzt voraus, dass die infrage kommenden 
Baltennachumsiedler in jeder Beziehung zuverlässig sind, (Gruppe I und II) da sie für Geheimarbeiten 
herangezogen werden sollen.” 
 
138See, for example: BAB. R 59/78. 173. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Umsiedlung. Rundschreiben Nr. 72. 
Betr.: Stenotypistinnen.” 8.10.41. “I request that inquiries be made in the camps and I be notified by 15 
October 1941, if and how many shorthand typists are still available.” “Ich bitten, in den Lagern nachfrage 
halten zu wollen und mir bis zum 25. Oktober 1941 zu melden, ob und wieviel Stenotypistinnen 
gegebenfalls noch zur Verfügung stehen.” 
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Settlers from Latvian and Estonia, who left behind an industrial, commercial, or 
craft enterprise in their country of origin can request to return to these areas and 
take over their enterprises again if: 
1.) in the former Reich district they still have not been installed as owner or 
commissarial manager of a new concern and 
2.) the abandoned enterprise is still capable of production. 
Dependents of these settlers, who themselves are settlers or who are Baltic 
Refugees belonging to Groups I or II, are likewise eligible to return, if requested 
by their former boss. A return of settlers and Baltic Refugees to whom these 
conditions to not apply (especially farmers and peasants) will not take place.”139 
 
Still, the organization responsible for springing the most Baltic Germans from the 
Warthegau was probably the Wehrmacht. This fact did not go unnoticed by frustrated SS 
officials. Already in early October 1941, the UWZ had collected enough reports to 
perceive a serious problem: many of the able-bodied male settlers were being drained 
from the Warthgau into the insatiable Wehrmacht:  
It has become evident that settlers who were mustered as front-line peasants [as 
the SS liked to call those resettled in the Warthgau], at the same time have 
volunteered for enlistment in the Wehrmacht and before their dismissal from their 
assignment as front-line peasants were called up in the Wehrmacht by the military 
district command. 140 
 
Joining the Wehrmacht was one sure way to escape Poland and possibly even 
return home one day. Certainly many Baltic German men chose that option. However, the 
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 NARA II. T 74. Roll 15. RDV 114. 387858. “Anordnung Nr. 48/I. Vorg.: Rückkehr von Umsiedlern un 
Baltenflüchtlinge in das Gebiet des Reichskommissariats Ostland.” Undated duplicate copy. After August 
1941. “Umsiedler aus Lettland oder Estland, die im Herkunftsland einen Industrie- Handels- oder 
Gewerbebetrieb zurückgelassen haben, können auf Antrag in diese Gebiete zurückkehren und ihre früheren 
Betriebe wieder übernehmen, wenn 
1.)   sie im bisherigen Reichsgebiet noch nicht in einem neuen Betrieb als Eigentümer oder 
kommissarischer Verwalter eingewiesen worden sind und 
2.) der zurückgelassene Gewerbebetrieb noch einsatzfähig ist. 
Gefolgschaftsmitglieder dieser Umsiedler, die entweder selbst Umsiedler sind oder als Baltenflüchtlinge 
den Gruppen I oder II angehören, können ebenfalls auf Antrag zurückkehren, wenn sie von ihrem 
ehemaligen Betriebsführer angefordert werden. Eine Rückführung von Umsiedler und Baltenflüchtlinge, 
die den vorstehenden Voraussetzungen nicht entsprechen (insbesondere von Landwirten und Bauern), 
findet nicht statt.” 
 
140
 BAB. R 59/78. 170. “Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – Umsiedlung. Rundschreiben No. 71. Betr.: 
Einberufungen von Frontbauern zur Wehrmacht.” 3.Oktober 41. “Es hat sich erwiesen, dass sich 
Umsiedler, die als Frontbauern gemustert wurden, gleichzeitig freiwillig zur Wehrmacht gemeldet haben 
und vor ihrer Abberufung zum Einsatz als Frontbauern durch die Wehrbezirkskommandos zur Wehrmacht 
einberufen wurden.”  
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motives behind this choice are open to interpretation. On the one hand, economic 
enticements and nationalism may have played a role in their volunteering. In the end, 
though, the situation in Poland must have been viewed as grim indeed if Wehrmacht 
service was seen as preferable to it. Given the growing threat of Polish partisan attacks on 
the newly-acquired homesteads of the Baltic Germans, Wehrmacht service may have 
seemed attractive, and at least then one would have a rifle. In any case, the Baltic 
Germans resettled in the Warthegau were melting away even before the Red Army’s 
arrival in the area in 1944. 
 
Summary 
It is true that approximately 90% of the Baltic German population, without 
coercion, opted for Reich citizenship and put themselves into the hands of the SS in the 
first resettlement in the winter of 1939-1940. The emigration was relatively orderly, 
voluntary, and to the extent that the term “legal” can really be applied to any policy 
enacted by the National Socialist government, the Baltic Germans had legally renounced 
their Estonian and Latvian citizenship in favor of the citizenship of the 1,000-year 
Reich.141 They traveled by ship directly from ports in Latvia and Estonia to Gotenhafen 
and Stettin. After processing, a fraction of them were deemed unsuitable for resettlement 
in the Warthgau, either for reasons of age, health, or racial or political concerns expressed 
by their evaluators. A large majority remained in the Warthegau, with large 
concentrations in and around Posen and Lodsch, where they were installed in functioning 
farms and furnished apartments the inhabitants of which – Jews and Poles – had been 
‘evacuated.’  
                                                 
141
 And its legal successors several years later, as it happened! 
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In the Baltic Germans’ departure, “Much equipment, of course, was sold, some 
was left behind to be liquidated later, and many gifts were given to good Latvian or 
Estonian friends.”142 The Latvians and Estonians actually felt some sadness, many having 
personal connections with Baltic Germans. The comments of a Latvian state official at 
the time summed up the mood: “The Latvian public looks at these preparations without 
hostility, without envy or taunts, and even with a certain empathy for the departing 
persons.”143 But also they feared the true meaning of this momentous event and for their 
own future. There may have even been a sense of betrayal, of being abandoned to the 
Soviets.  
 The Nachumsiedlung, which took place in the winter and spring of 1941, had a 
markedly different character from the first, and the people who were resettled had a much 
different experience. Latvia and Estonia were at that time under Soviet occupation and 
those wishing to leave were subject to intense Soviet intimidation. Rather than an orderly 
population transfer, this action took on the nature of an evacuation. Presumed of less 
racial worth or political reliability than the Baltic Germans who had volunteered for the 
initial resettlement in the winter of 1939-40, these people were sent to camps in the Reich 
to await processing before they could be assigned work and accomodations outside of 
their camp. By this point, the Latvians and Estonians could not blame the Baltic Germans 
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 E.C Helmreich. “International Affairs: The Return of the Baltic Germans.” The American Political 
Science Review. Vol. 36, No. 4. (Aug., 1942), p. 713. 
 
143
 General Secretary M. Nukša. “Overview of the Repatriation of Baltic Germans,” in Experiencing 
Totalitarianism: The Invasion and Occupation of Latvia by the USSR and Nazi Germany, 1939-1991: A 
Documentary History. Andrejs Plakans, ed. Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2007. For an interesting, 
conflicted, Latvian retrospective on the departure of the Baltic Germans, see: Adolfs Šilde. “Die 
Umsiedlung der Deutschbalten aus Lettland 1939 aus lettischer Sicht.” Acta Baltica. Vol. 17. (1989), pp. 
87-98. Šilde was a Latvian who fled to the West before the reconquest of Latvia by the USSR and became a 
prolific anti-Soviet, nationalist exile. During the war, he collaborated with the German occupation regime 
by writing pro-National Socialist newspaper articles for Tevija, German-occupied Latvia’s semi-official 
mouthpiece. 
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for wanting to flee. In fact, the Nachumsiedler consisted of two major subsets: Baltic 
Refugees of Latvian and Estonian background, and Baltic Germans. Like the settlers 
before them, all were eventually subjected to evaluation according to the political and 
racial guidelines set down by the SS.  
 Operation Barbarossa was a major turning point for the Baltic Germans, since it 
seemed to hold the promise of returning home. The SS struggled to keep that door closed, 
but many Baltic Germans managed to get home, at least for a time. The Nachumsiedler, 
the bulk of whom were in the Reich, found it easier to return. National Socialist ideology 
had less invested in them. But rather than gradually settling into and becoming resigned 
to their new lives, the Baltic Germans of the Warthegau struggled ever harder to escape 
their assigned role. Some managed to leave. The Baltic Germans who were sent to camps 
in the Reich were quickly scattered far and wide, obtaining work across the Reich, in the 
military, or even back in Latvia and Estonia working for a variety of organizations. 
Ultimately, wherever they were, in the end they fled the advancing Soviet armies. 
In general, as a preferred group, the Baltic Germans could hardly complain about 
their treatment by the Third Reich, especially in light of the absolute horrors that were 
inflicted upon other groups, not the least of whom were the Polish and Jewish owners of 
the properties that had been expropriated by the Reich and used to house the incoming 
Baltic Germans themselves. Yet, it speaks to the unspeakable nature of the National 
Socialist state that even this ‘favored’ group nevertheless found itself scattered and in 
shambles after the war courtesy of the ideological SS wrecking-ball. Probably everyone 
just wanted to be at home, like before the war. But for most Baltic Germans, it was a one-
way ticket. 
  
VI. THE BALTIC GERMANS AFTER THE WAR 
1945 – 1991  
The dissolution of the Baltic German community, in fact, began with Hitler’s 
Reichstag speech of 6 October 1939, and continued throughout the duration of the war as 
they were dispersed across the Altreich, in the Warthegau, and along the war fronts in the 
Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS. In the final months of the war, order collapsed and 
everyone’s overriding goal was only to escape the Soviets. Thus, the Baltic Germans 
began their World War Two story as a cohesive and unified ethnic minority in Latvia and 
Estonia, were split up into groups by the National Socialists themselves according to their 
political and racial criteria, further splintered in the face of German wartime requirements 
for soldiers and laborers, and faced the postwar years as an almost utterly atomized group 
flung across two Germanies and three continents – or perhaps no real ‘group,’ as such, at 
all. 
The Baltic Germans who found themselves in the DDR never constituted any 
collective associations that have left a trace. Meanwhile, in the Latvian and Estonian 
SSRs, authorities were keen to efface all traces of German influence. Baltic German 
cemeteries were demolished. Old estates, landmarks, monuments, and the like were 
vandalized, removed, or forgotten and left to rot. 
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In the BRD, the Baltic Germans remained scattered.144 Baltic Germans 
established or reestablished some cultural organizations, student fraternities, and 
genealogical societies, although only a few would last out the 20th Century. These 
organizations have dedicated themselves to preserving Baltic German history and 
marshalling the remnants of their community and continuing what traditions they can. 
 Small Baltic German enclaves also formed in the United States, Canada, 
and Austrailia, composed of Baltic German displaced persons.145 These small groups 
have almost completely assimilated themselves into the majority population. 
 
1991 – present 
There was no exodus of Baltic Germans from abroad into Latvia and Estonia after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. Today, the Baltic Germans have no collective political goals. 
On the part of the Baltic Germans there is no desire for a return to ‘glory’ not only 
because the notion is absurd on its face and completely impossible, but because the times 
have changed. The kind of ideology that brought the Baltic Germans en masse out of 
Latvia and Estonia, out of their former homes, is barely even a ghost anymore in terms of 
contemporary European politics, with the significant exception of the territories of the 
former Yugoslavia. Today’s international diplomacy, Europe’s increasingly shared social 
and democratic political values, and the normalization of humanitarian ideals will 
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 The locations of the Baltic Germans interviewed for the Federal Archives in 1958-59 suggest this also, 
although it would be dangerous to read too much into this single sample: 
Bielefeld: 1; Bochum: 1; Bremen: 1; Düsseldorf: 1; Gladbeck: 2; Göttingen: 1; Hamburg: 1; Hannover: 7; 
Kiel: 1; Köln: 1; Lübeck: 1; Marburg: 1; Mehlem: 1; Neckarsulm-Amorbach: 1; Oldenburg: 1; Otterndorf: 
1; Ravensburg: 1; Rietburg: 1; Rottenburg: 1; Schwabach: 1; Siegburg: 1; Uelzen: 1; Walsrode: 1; 
Wiesbaden: 1. 31 Baltic Germans living in 23 different towns and cities. 
 
145
 For example, in the mid-1980s, an estimated 5,000 Baltic Germans lived in Canada. This number 
presumably includes those born after the war in Canada. The Baltic-Germans: Reminiscences. M.F. 
Kuester, ed. Edmonton, Canada: Central and East European Studies Society of Alberta, 1985, p. 12.  
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hopefully prevent the future application of such creative ways to destroy lives and 
communities as the National Socialists invented. It is a new Germany today, inhabited by 
new Germans (Baltic or otherwise). This is due in no small part to the new atmosphere in 
Europe fostered by the existence of the European Union. Germany was a charter member 
and Latvia and Estonia, only a few years ago, joined as well. 
“Deutsch-Balten” is how the Baltic Germans preferred to be called after the war. 
They view “Baltendeutsch” as a National Socialist term, emphasizing their Germanness 
over their Balticness, and they cringe at the term because of what is has historically 
meant for them. They are not Baltendeutsche today but Deutsch-Balten – to emphasize 
their identity with the Baltic Peoples – although they have never been so German as they 
are now. 
But can stepping off a plane in a country you’ve never seen before be a 
homecoming? Baltic Germans today return to Latvia and Estonia to admire the 
architecture in the old town, searching for plaques bearing German names on the old 
guild houses, storehouses, and guardhouses. They visit the cathedrals. They rent cars and 
look for neglected gravesites in the countryside. 
Today, at worst, Latvians and Estonians are indifferent to the Baltic Germans and 
possess a fading memory of bygone and buried outrages, rendered indistinct by the 
passage of time because of the fresher outrages committed against them by the Soviet 
Union. At best, there may be a twinge of sentimentality amongst the Latvians who gaze 
up as the wind blows stiffly against the Latvian flag atop the tower of the old baronial 
castle at Sigulda, or look over the overgrown rubble of the ancient forts sprinkled across 
Kurzēme, when they remember the people who were there, but are no longer. 
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Like most countries in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States have not come fully to terms 
with their experience of the Third Reich. Under Soviet rule, public discourse on the 
subject was delayed, deformed, and full of denial. Thus another component of the current 
bond or lack of bond between the Latvians and the Baltic Germans is an unexpected 
common cause: neither wants to truly remember. The memories have been largely 
repressed, for who stands to benefit from their public remembrance? The Baltic Germans 
obeyed the dictates of Hitler and were, in effect, complicit in their own destruction. The 
Latvians and Estonians did not try to stop them. The Baltic Germans by their action, and 
the others by their inaction, can take little pride in this episode. For better or for worse, 
both sides seem to have let the sleeping dog lie. They are neighbors no more. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Does Time, as the proverb says, heal all wounds? If so, how does the passage of 
time, which we call history, effect it? It begins with bloodshed in the place that Heinrich 
von Treitschke called “the classical land of peasant oppression.”146 First in the 1905 
Revolution, and then, only a few years later, in the Wars for Independence, Baltic 
Germans and Latvians and Estonians were killing each other. Stability set in during the 
period of Baltic independent statehood, although tensions twisted and throbbed beneath 
the surface. The year 1939 brought the Second World War and the resettlement of the 
Baltic Germans out of Latvia and Estonia, ending their 700-year presence in those lands. 
The war and its aftermath, to a large degree, saw the Baltic Germans destroyed or 
dispersed as a cohesive cultural and ethnic group. The year 1991 was a watershed. Baltic 
Germans could finally go back to their old Heimat.  
Hitler called the Baltic Germans “heim ins Reich” in 1939. Where is home now? 
There is no more Reich, but there is a Federal Republic of Germany. Is that home now? 
Or was the real home of the Baltic Germans lost forever? In another generation, the 
descendents of the Umsiedler of 1939-1940 and the Nachumsiedler of 1941 will be in 
precisely what way ‘Baltic’ Germans? 
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 Quoted in Gershon Shafir. Immigrants and Nationalists, p. 131. 
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Theirs is a past largely relinquished. The distinctive Baltic German accent can 
now only faintly be heard. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BAB: Bundesarchiv-Berlin 
 
BRD: Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) 
 
DDR: Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic) 
 
DAG: Deutsche Ansiedlungsgesellschaft (German Settlement Corporation) 
 
DVL: Deutsche Volksliste (List of Ethnic Germans) 
 
EWZ: Einwandererzentralstelle (Central Immigrant Office) 
 
HSSPF: Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer (Superior SS and Police Leader) 
 
LAA: Lastenausgleichsarchiv-Bayreuth 
 
NARA II: National Archives and Records Administration II-College Park, Maryland 
 
RKFDV: Reichskommissar/iat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (Reich  
Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom) 
 
RuSHA: Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (Race and Settlement Main Office) 
 
UWZ: Umwandererzentralstelle (Central Emmigrant Office) 
 
VoMi: Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Ethnic German Liaison Office) 
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APPENDIX A 
Departmental Organization of the Einwandererzentralstelle During Durchschleusung: 
A. Registration Office (Delegate from: Chief of the Order Police). Police 
registration collection/Card catalogue. Registration Cards = data list. 
B. Identification Office (Delegate from: Chief of the Security Police). Settler IDs. 
C. Photographic Office (Delegate from: Chief of the Security Police). Had the 
assignment of creating the necessary photographs, etc. for the Identification, the 
Health Cards, and the Aptitude Cards. Beyond that, it also made photographs for 
scientific and statistical purposes. 
D. Health Office (Delegate from: Reich Interior Minister and the Reich Health 
Leader). Health and hereditary biology. 
E. Race and Settlement Office (Delegate from: Race and Settlement Office). 
F. Citizenship Office (Delegate from: Reich Interior Minister). Examination of 
political and ethnic background (and previous attitude toward Germandom). 
G. Occupational Placement Office (Delegate from: Reich Work Ministry). Only 
associated from October 1939 – Summer 1940. 
Y. Property Office (Delegate from: Reich Finance Ministry). Only at Operational 
Staff and Branch Office levels. Had the assignment of checking property both 
brought and left behind. They were associated as a Reich bank liaison. This 
assignment was later assumed by the German Settlement and Trust Company. 
X. Statistical Office (Delegate from: Reich Statistical Office). Central data 
collection.147 
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 This description comes from the Findbuch of BAB. R 69: Einwandererzentralstelle Litzmannstadt. 
“Fachstellen in der EWZ: 
A. Meldestelle (Abgeordnet von: Chef der Ordnungspolizei). Meldepolizeiliche Erfassung/Kartei. 
Meldekarten = Stammblätter. 
B. Ausweisstelle (Abgeordnet von: Chef der Sipo). Umsiedlerausweis. 
C. Lichtbildstelle (Abgeordnet von: Chef der Sipo). Hatte die Aufgabe, die nötigen Lichtbilder 
herzustellen, u.a. für den Ausweis, die Gesundheitskarte, und die Eignungskarte. Darüber hinaus stellte sie 
auch Fotos für wissenschaftliche und statistische Zwecke her. 
D. Gesundheitsstelle (Abgeordnet von: Reichsminister des Innern u. Reichsgesundheitsführer). Gesundheit 
und Erbbiologisch. 
E. Rasse- und Siedlungs Dienststelle (Abgeordnet von: Rasse- und Siedlungs Hauptamt). 
F. Staatsanghörigkeitsstelle (Abgeordnet von: Reichsminister des Innern). Überprüfung: politischen und 
Volkstumszugehörigkeit (und des bisherigen Verhaltens in Deutschtum). 
G. Berufseinsatzstelle (Abgeordnet von: Reichsarbeitsministerium). Nur von Okt. 1939 – Sommer 1940 
angegliedert. 
Y. Vermögensstelle (Abgeordnet von: Reichsfinanzministerium). Nur bei Führungsstab und Nebenstelle. 
Hatte die Aufgabe, das zurückgelassene und mitgebrauchte Vermögen zu überprüfen. Ihr war die 
Verbindungsstelle der Reichsbank angeschlossen. Diese Aufgabe übernahm späterhin die Deutsche 
Umsiedlungs- und Treuhand GmbH. 
X. Statistische Stelle (Abgeordnet von: Statistisches Reichsamt). Zentralen Sammlung Daten. 
Bis auf die Statistische Stelle bestande alle diese Dienststellen sowohl beim Führungsstab als auch bei den 
Nebenstellen und Fliegenden Kommissionen, wo sie von den zu erfassenden Personen in wenigen Stunden 
durchlaufen wurden. Die auf diese Weise durchgeführte Erfassung wurde ‘Durchschleusung’ genannt.” 
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APPENDIX B 
 
The Main Assignments of the Einwandererzentralstelle: 
 
  The UWZ had the following main assignments: 
(1.) Official Compilation [of records]; 
(2.) Ascertainment of citizenship relationships with respect to naturalization; 
(3.) Final approval of settler’s characteristics with respect to the examination of 
lineage and the possibility of re-Germanization; 
(4.) Decision on the departure of settlers; and 
(5.) Supplying all documents necessary for the departure of the settlers.148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
148
 This description comes from the Findbuch in the Bundesarchiv-Berlin Lichterfeld for R 69. 
“Die EWZ hatte folgende Hauptaufgaben: 
(1.) Behördlichen Erfassung; 
(2.) Feststellung des staatsbürgerlichen Verhältnisse, bzw. Einbürgerung; 
(3.) Endgültige Anerkennung der Umsiedlereigenschaft bzw. Überprüfung der Abstammung und der 
Möglichkeit der Wiedereindeutschungsfähigkeit; 
(4.) Entscheidung über den Ansatz der Umsiedler; und 
(5.) Bereitstellung alle für den Ansatz der Umsiedler notwendigen Unterlagen.” 
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